Results for: Exxon

Court calls a halt to Exxon case against Arjuna

In January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. Then, the two proponents notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal and promised not to refile; therefore, they said, the case was moot. But Exxon refused to withdraw its complaint because it believed that there was still a critical live controversy for the Court to resolve.  And the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed—at least as to Arjuna.  While the Court dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, it allowed the case against Arjuna to proceed on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, citing precedent that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” (For background on this case, see this PubCo post.) According to the Court, the “voluntary-cessation doctrine requires more than platitudes to render a case moot;…to moot Exxon’s claim, Defendants must show that it is ‘absolutely clear’ the relevant conduct ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” But the argument continued, even after the decision was rendered, as Arjuna continued to submit letters to Exxon in which Arjuna “unconditionally and irrevocably covenant[ed] to refrain henceforth from submitting any proposal for consideration by Exxon shareholders relating to GHG or climate change,” and Exxon continued to contend that the letters were not enough.  (See this PubCo post.)  Finally, yesterday, after a hearing on the matter, the Court called a halt, issuing an Order that Exxon’s claim was moot and dismissing the action without prejudice. But not before the Court got in a few digs at Arjuna, activism and even at the SEC.

Exxon persists in battle against Arjuna

When we last checked in on the ExxonMobil litigation against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This—in which Exxon sought a declaratory judgment that it may exclude the two defendants’ proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement—the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas had just dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, but allowed the case against Arjuna to proceed on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. (For background on this case, see this PubCo post.) The two proponents had contended that, because Arjuna and Follow This had withdrawn their proposal and promised not to refile, there was no live case or controversy. As a result, they asserted, Exxon’s claim was moot, and the Court had no subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court held that Exxon had the “winning argument,” citing precedent that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”  According to the court, the “voluntary-cessation doctrine requires more than platitudes to render a case moot;…to moot Exxon’s claim, Defendants must show that it is ‘absolutely clear’ the relevant conduct ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” After the decision was rendered, Arjuna submitted a letter to Exxon in which Arjuna “unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain henceforth from submitting any proposal for consideration by Exxon shareholders relating to GHG or climate change.” End of story? Not quite. 

Exxon court challenge to Arjuna shareholder proposal survives dismissal [updated]

You may recall that, in January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. Then, the two proponents notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal.  End of story? Hardly. In a status update filed in February, Exxon explained that it would not withdraw the complaint because it believed that there was still a critical live controversy for the Court to resolve. Arjuna and Follow This both moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas has just issued its opinion:  the Court dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the case against Arjuna survives on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Arjuna has now responded by letter. However, this conflict isn’t just about Exxon and two small activist shareholders. It has taken on much larger proportions: some business groups have joined with Exxon to bemoan the “hijacking” by special interest groups of Rule 14a-8 to “advance their preferred social policies” and “inundate public corporations with proposals designed to push ideological agendas.” Others have questioned whether, under the First Amendment, the SEC, through Rule 14a-8, has the right to compel companies to use their proxy statements to speak about contentious political issues. On the other side, some investors lament Exxon’s “aggressive tactics” that threaten to “diminish the role—and the rights—of every investor.” Stay tuned on this one.

Does shareholder primacy mean just maximizing profits—and what does Exxon have to do with it?

As you know, the shareholder primacy theory is widely attributed to the Chicago school of economists, beginning in the 1970s, with economist Milton Friedman famously arguing that the only “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”  Subsequently, two other economists published a paper characterizing shareholders as “‘principals’ who hired executives and board members as ‘agents.’ In other words, when you are an executive or corporate director, you work for the shareholders.” The idea, in effect, is that, as owners, shareholders may legitimately require that the company conduct its business in accordance with their desires. Of course, this idea has been subject to criticism by many as improperly ignoring the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, customers and the community—so-called “stakeholder capitalism.”  Under Friedman’s version of shareholder primacy, the desire of shareholders has long been presumed to be to maximize value and increase profits. But is it? The author of this article in Fortune makes the argument that the ongoing Exxon litigation against Arjuna and Follow This, two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal, throws into sharp relief a schism that has formed among adherents to the idea of shareholder primacy. The question posed is “what do shareholders really want, and are companies ever allowed to ignore them? Arjuna and Follow This own Exxon stock and are trying to dictate how the energy giant behaves. However, they are demanding more than dividends: They want Exxon to commit to more ambitious emissions reductions, and to some, that’s just as bad as companies admitting an obligation to workers or the community.” Does shareholder primacy necessarily mean just maximizing profits?

Temperature drops on Exxon litigation over shareholder climate proposal—or does it?

You remember that, in January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement? On February 1, Exxon filed a notice of withdrawal of its request for an expedited briefing schedule for its summary judgment motion in the case. Why? Because the two proponents had notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal.  End of story? Not necessarily.  Exxon told Reuters that it would not withdraw the complaint, maintaining that there were still critical issues for the Court.  And in a Court filing yesterday, Exxon explained why it believed that there was still a live controversy for the Court to resolve. How the Court responds remains to be seen. But regardless of what the Court decides, the withdrawal of the proposal in response to the litigation may well encourage other companies, similarly faced with unwelcome proposals, to bypass the SEC’s standard shareholder proposal process and follow the go straight-to-court strategy.

Exxon employs “direct-to-court” strategy for shareholder proposal. Will others do the same?

Back in 2014, a few companies, facing shareholder proposals from the prolific shareholder-proposal activist, John Chevedden, and his associates, adopted a “direct-to-court” strategy, bypassing the standard SEC no-action process for exclusion of shareholder proposals.  In each of these cases, the court handed a victory of sorts to Mr. Chevedden, refusing to issue declaratory judgments that the companies could exclude his proposals. (At the end of the day, one proposal was defeated, one succeeded and one was ultimately permitted to be excluded by the SEC. See this PubCo post, and these News Briefs of 3/18/14, 3/13/14 and 3/3/14.) Now, ten years later, ExxonMobil has picked up the baton, having just filed a complaint against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. In summary, the proposal asks Exxon to accelerate the reduction of GHG emissions in the medium term and to disclose new plans, targets and timetables for these reductions.  Will Exxon meet the same fate as the companies in 2014? Perhaps more significantly, Exxon took this action in part because it viewed the SEC’s shareholder proposal process as a “flawed” system “that does not serve investors’ interests and has become ripe for abuse by activists with minimal shares and no interest in growing long-term shareholder value.” If Exxon is successful in its litigation, will more companies, likewise faced with environmental or social proposals and perhaps perceiving themselves beset by the same flawed process, follow suit (so to speak) and sidestep the SEC?

ExxonMobil shareholders approve climate change proposal — are shareholder proposals on climate change becoming a thing?

by Cydney Posner Are we witnessing the beginning of a new trend?  The history of shareholder proposals to enhance disclosure regarding climate change has been a dismal one. But suddenly, this proxy season, we have climate change proposals succeeding at two — and, as of today, three — major companies. […]

Corp Fin staff issues new CDI regarding representations required in Exxon Capital Exchanges

by Cydney Posner Corp Fin has posted a new CDI regarding the use of Form S-4 in connection with so-called “Exxon Capital” exchanges. In an Exxon Capital exchange (Exxon Capital Holdings Corporation (April 13, 1988)), an issuer that has privately sold non-convertible debt (or certain other securities) to large, sophisticated […]

SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee discusses tracing in §11 litigation and shareholder proposals—will they recommend SEC action?

Last week, at the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee meeting, the Committee discussed two topics described as “pain points” for investors: tracing in §11 litigation and shareholder proposals. In the discussion of §11 and tracing issues, the presenting panel made a strong pitch for SEC intervention to facilitate tracing and restore §11 liability following Slack Technologies v. Pirani. The panel advocated that the Committee make recommendations to the SEC to solve this problem. With regard to shareholder proposals, the Committee considered whether the current regulatory framework appropriately protected investors’ ability to submit shareholder proposals or did it result in an overload of shareholder proposals? Was Exxon v. Arjuna a reflection of exasperation experienced by many companies? No clear consensus view emerged other than the desire for a balanced approach and a stable set of rules. Recommendations from SEC advisory committees often hold some sway with the staff and the commissioners, so it’s worth paying attention to the outcome here.

What were the major trends of the 2024 proxy season on ESG shareholder proposals?

This article from Morningstar published on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance examines three major trends of the 2024 proxy season regarding environmental, social and governance shareholder proposals.  The author, the Director of Investment Stewardship Research at Morningstar, reports that, while the number of ESG-related proposals increased, there was a “twist in the tale”:  the increase primarily reflected a jump in anti-ESG proposals. Although support for ESG proposals on the whole was relatively flat at 23%, Morningstar found a “rebound in support for governance-focused proposals,” offsetting a decline in support for E&S proposals.