Category: Executive Compensation
Alliance Advisors wraps up the 2023 proxy season
Alliance Advisors, a proxy solicitation and corporate advisory firm, has posted its 2023 Proxy Season Review, an analysis of trends from the 2023 proxy season. Its principal message: ESG proposals saw sagging results again this year, “continuing a downward trend” from 2021. Although the number of shareholder proposals submitted to U.S. public companies was substantial (958 as of June 30, 2023, compared with 987 for all of 2022), Alliance Advisors reports that there was a dramatic decline from last year in “average support across all categories of shareholder proposals,” and “the number of majority votes plunged from 80 in 2022 to 28 in the first half of 2023.” More specifically, according to Alliance, average support on governance proposals fell to 29.9% in 2023 from 37.4% in 2022 and 38.4% in 2021, and there was a bit of a roller-coaster effect on compensation-related proposals, where average support declined to 23.7% in 2023 from 31.4% in 2022 but increased from 21% in 2021. Most pronounced was the change in average support for environmental and social (E&S) proposals, which declined to 18.3% in 2023 from 27.3% in 2022 and 37.2% in 2021. Will it turn out that 2021 was the “high-water mark” for shareholder proposals on ESG? The report explores trends in shareholder proposals and examines what may account for the flagging voting results.
Corp Fin issues some new CDIs on Rule 10b5-1 plans
On Friday afternoon, Corp Fin issued several new CDIs regarding Rule 10b5-1 plans. As you may recall, in December last year, the SEC adopted new amendments to the rules regarding Rule 10b5-1 plans. These amendments added new conditions to the affirmative defense of Rule 10b5-1(c) designed to address concerns about abuse of the rule by opportunistic trading on the basis of material non-public information. Among other changes, Rule 10b5-1(c)(1) was amended to apply a cooling-off period to persons other than the issuer, impose a good-faith certification requirement on directors and officers, limit the ability of persons other than the issuer to use multiple overlapping Rule 10b5-1 plans, limit the use of single-trade plans by persons other than the issuer to one single-trade plan in any 12-month period, and add a condition that all persons entering into Rule 10b5-1 plans must act in good faith with respect to those plans. In addition, the amendments included requirements for new disclosures regarding (1) companies’ insider trading policies and procedures; (2) director and officer equity compensation awards made close in time to company to disclosure of MNPI; (3) adoption or termination by officers of directors of any 10b5-1 plan or “non-Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangement”; and (4) bona fide gifts of securities on Forms 4 by Section 16 filers and transactions under 10b5-1 plans on Forms 4 and 5. ) (See this PubCo post.)
The new CDIs, summarized below, address calculation of the cooling-off period, overlapping plans involving 401(k) plans, the new Form 4 checkbox and disclosures about adoption and termination of trading arrangements.
How the S&P 500 responded to the new PVP disclosure rules
Those who want to see what the large-company mainstream is doing on comp disclosure might be interested in a recent report, Observations from S&P 500 Pay-Versus-Performance Disclosures, from comp consultant FW Cook & Co. Cook provides analysis of how the 403 companies in the S&P 500 that filed 2023 proxy statements as of June 1, 2023, responded to the SEC’s new rule amendments on pay versus performance.
SEC approves NYSE and Nasdaq delay of timing of clawback policy compliance
Last week, both the NYSE and Nasdaq filed with the SEC amendments delaying until October 2 the effective dates of their proposed listing standards requiring listed issuers to develop and implement clawback policies. On Friday afternoon, the SEC approved the proposed rule changes, as modified by the respective Amendments No. 1, on an accelerated basis. What does that time delay mean for companies? Under the SEC final rules and the proposed listing standards, each listed issuer is required to adopt the mandated clawback policy no later than 60 days following the effective date of the rule. Prior to the amendments, the effective dates were designated by both exchanges as the SEC approval dates, which the SEC had just extended to June 11. (See this PubCo post.) Now, with October 2 as the effective date for both proposals, companies will have until December 1 to put their clawback policies in place.
Corp Fin posts three new CDIs on Rule 10b5-1
Last week, Corp Fin posted (and then deleted and reposted—but that’s another story) three new CDIs regarding the affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1. As you may recall, in December last year, the SEC adopted new amendments to the rules regarding Rule 10b5-1 plans. These amendments added new conditions to the affirmative defense of Rule 10b5-1(c) designed to address concerns about abuse of the rule by opportunistic trading on the basis of material non-public information. Among other changes, Rule 10b5-1(c)(1) was amended to apply a cooling-off period to persons other than the issuer, impose a good-faith certification requirement on directors and officers, limit the ability of persons other than the issuer to use multiple overlapping Rule 10b5-1 plans, limit the use of single-trade plans by persons other than the issuer to one single-trade plan in any 12-month period, and add a condition that all persons entering into Rule 10b5-1 plans must act in good faith with respect to those plans. In addition, the amendments included requirements for new disclosures regarding (1) companies’ insider trading policies and procedures, and the use of 10b5-1 plans and certain other similar trading arrangements by directors and officers; (2) director and officer equity compensation awards made close in time to company to disclosure of MNPI; and (3) bona fide gifts of securities on Forms 4 by Section 16 filers and transactions under 10b5-1 plans on Forms 4 and 5. (See this PubCo post.) The new CDIs relate to the timing of compliance and the use and termination of multiple plans.
SEC adopts “better-than-it-might-have-been” final rules for stock buyback disclosure [UPDATED]
[This post revises and updates my earlier post primarily to reflect the contents of the adopting release.]
At an open meeting last week, the SEC voted three to two to adopt a proposal intended to modernize and improve disclosure regarding company stock repurchases. Issuers have something to be relieved about and something to be mildly anxious about. The good news is what the SEC didn’t do: the new rule does away with the proposed Form SR for domestic companies and backs off the proposed requirement for almost real-time (daily) reporting of share repurchases. Instead, the final rule moves to quarterly reporting of detailed quantitative information on daily repurchase activity, filed as exhibits to issuers’ periodic reports. The more vexing aspect is that domestic issuers will be required to begin this reporting, along with the new narrative disclosure, starting with the first Form 10-Q or 10-K covering the first full fiscal quarter (i.e., for the 10-K, the 4th quarter) that begins on or after October 1, 2023. That means that companies will need to get on the stick to begin to develop processes and procedures for collection of that data. In addition, the information will be deemed “filed” and not “furnished,” as originally proposed, which means that it could be subject to Section 18 and Section 11 liability. The amendments will also revise and expand the narrative requirements and add a new requirement for disclosure regarding a company’s adoption and termination of Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangements. In the press release, Chair Gary Gensler observed that “[i]n 2021, buybacks amounted to nearly $950 billion and reportedly reached more than $1.25 trillion in 2022….Today’s amendments will increase the transparency and integrity of this significant means by which issuers transact in their own securities. Through these disclosures, investors will be able to better assess issuer buyback programs. The disclosures will also help lessen some of the information asymmetries inherent between issuers and investors in buybacks. That’s good for investors, issuers, and the markets.” Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissented, with Peirce remarking that “better-than-it-might-have-been is not my standard for supporting a final rule.”
SEC adopts “better-than-it-might-have-been” final rules for stock buyback disclosure
At an open meeting yesterday, the SEC voted three to two to adopt a proposal intended to modernize and improve disclosure regarding company stock repurchases. Issuers have something to be relieved about and something to be mildly anxious about. The good news is what the SEC didn’t do: the new rule does away with the proposed Form SR for domestic companies and backs off the proposed requirement for almost real-time (daily) reporting of share repurchases. Instead, the final rule moves to quarterly reporting of detailed quantitative information on daily repurchase activity, filed as exhibits to issuers’ periodic reports. The more vexing aspect is that domestic issuers will be required to begin this reporting, along with the new narrative disclosure, starting with the first Form 10-Q or 10-K covering the first full fiscal quarter (i.e., for the 10-K, the 4th quarter) that begins on or after October 1, 2023. That means that companies will need to get on the stick to begin to develop processes and procedures for collection of that data. The amendments will also revise and expand the narrative requirements and add a new requirement for disclosure regarding a company’s adoption and termination of Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangements. In the press release, Chair Gary Gensler observed that “[i]n 2021, buybacks amounted to nearly $950 billion and reportedly reached more than $1.25 trillion in 2022….Today’s amendments will increase the transparency and integrity of this significant means by which issuers transact in their own securities. Through these disclosures, investors will be able to better assess issuer buyback programs. The disclosures will also help lessen some of the information asymmetries inherent between issuers and investors in buybacks. That’s good for investors, issuers, and the markets.” Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissented, with Peirce remarking that “better-than-it-might-have-been is not my standard for supporting a final rule.”
Mild reprieve on timing of clawback policy
As noted in TheCorporateCounsel.net blog, this week, the SEC posted notices that it is extending the time period for approval of the NYSE and Nasdaq proposed listing standards for clawback policies for listed issuers. Originally, the SEC was expected to approve (or disapprove or institute proceedings to determine whether to disapprove) the proposed new standards by April 27, 2023; the approval date is now extended to June 11. The SEC is extending the time period to allow “sufficient time to consider the proposed rule change and the comments received.” What does that time delay mean for companies? Under the SEC final rules and the proposed listing standards, each listed issuer must adopt the required clawback policy no later than 60 days following the effective date of rule, which, under the exchange proposals, is the approval date. That approval date now moves to June 11, which looks to be a Sunday, allowing companies a brief extension of time until around August 10 or so (depending on the date of the actual approval) to get their policies together.
What we need to know about corporate governance—but don’t
In this paper, Seven Gaping Holes in Our Knowledge of Corporate Governance, from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford, the authors observe that it “is extremely difficult to produce high-quality, fundamental insights into corporate governance.” Why is that? Well there are lots of reasons. According to the authors, instead of the theory, measurement and analysis that you might expect—given that corporate governance is a social science—the “dialogue about corporate governance is dominated by rhetoric, assertions, and opinions that—while strongly held—are not necessarily supported by either applicable theory or empirical evidence.” And even empirical work from academics has serious shortcomings, often detecting a pattern that is not amenable to specific application or making findings that are too specific to generalize. Or, studies might find correlation but not permit attribution of causation; or it may be hard to suss out key variables that may not be publicly observable. As a result, there remain “central issues where insufficient or inadequate study has left us unable to answer basic questions, and where key assumptions relied upon by experts have not been verified or validated.” The paper attempts to identify some of them and home in on potential further areas of study.
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