Category: Accounting and Auditing
Is political corruption securities fraud?
You remember Matt Levine’s mantra in his “Money Stuff” column on Bloomberg: “everything is securities fraud”? “You know the basic idea,” he says, a
“company does something bad, or something bad happens to it. Its stock price goes down, because of the bad thing. Shareholders sue: Doing the bad thing and not immediately telling shareholders about it, the shareholders say, is securities fraud. Even if the company does immediately tell shareholders about the bad thing, which is not particularly common, the shareholders might sue, claiming that the company failed to disclose the conditions and vulnerabilities that allowed the bad thing to happen. And so contributing to global warming is securities fraud, and sexual harassment by executives is securities fraud, and customer data breaches are securities fraud, and mistreating killer whales is securities fraud, and whatever else you’ve got. Securities fraud is a universal regulatory regime; anything bad that is done by or happens to a public company is also securities fraud, and it is often easier to punish the bad thing as securities fraud than it is to regulate it directly.” (Money Stuff, 6/26/19)
(See this PubCo post.) But here’s a new one—bribery and political corruption as securities fraud. As described in this press release, in the fiscal-year-end enforcement crush, the SEC brought settled charges against Exelon Corporation, a utility services holding company, and its subsidiary, electric utility company Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), and filed a complaint against ComEd’s former CEO alleging “fraud in connection with a multi-year scheme to corruptly influence and reward the then-Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives.” Exelon and ComEd agreed to settle the charges, with Exelon paying a civil penalty of $46.2 million. The charges against the CEO are headed for trial. So how is this securities fraud? According to the Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Public Finance Abuse Unit, the CEO’s “remarks to investors about ComEd’s lobbying efforts hid the reality of the long-running political corruption scheme in which they were engaged….When corporate executives speak to investors, they must not mislead by omission.”
SEC charges executives with fraudulent revenue recognition practices
As part of its fiscal-year-end enforcement surge, the SEC filed charges against three former executives of Pareteum Corporation, a telecommunications and cloud software company, for fraudulent revenue recognition practices—a settled action against the former controller and a complaint against the former CFO and former Chief Commercial Officer (also, formerly CEO). As described in the complaint, the SEC charged the former executives with orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to overstate revenue by recording revenue from non-binding purchase orders and concealing the practice from the company’s auditors. From 2018 through mid-2019, the SEC alleged, the defendants’ improper revenue recognition practices resulted in the company’s overstating revenue by “approximately $12 million for fiscal year 2018 (60% of the ultimately restated revenue), and by approximately $30 million for the first and second quarters of 2019 (91% of the ultimately restated revenue).” In addition, the former CFO, the SEC charged, did not establish sufficient internal accounting controls to assess whether revenue should be recognized under GAAP. According to the press release, Pareteum previously settled with the SEC on accounting and disclosure fraud charges in 2021 and filed for bankruptcy in 2022. Notably, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY has announced parallel criminal charges against the former CFO and CCO. According to the Associate Director of Enforcement for the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office, as the SEC alleged in its complaint, “Pareteum’s executives artificially inflated Pareteum’s revenue numbers to create the illusion of robust revenue growth….Investors should be able to trust public companies to issue truthful and accurate financial statements, and we will hold accountable any executives who abuse that trust and defraud investors.”
SEC charges Newell with misleading disclosure and control failures
In this settled action, the SEC charged Newell Brands and its former CEO with providing misleading disclosure about a prominently featured non-GAAP financial measure—“core sales,” a key NGFM that Newell portrayed as providing “a more complete understanding of underlying sales trends.” As described in the Order and press release, Newell and its CEO took a number of actions—reclassifications, accrual reductions, order pull-forwards—that increased “core sales” growth, but the resulting increases “were out of step with Newell’s actual but undisclosed sales trends, allowing the company to announce ‘strong’ or ‘solid’ results in quarters it internally described as disappointing due to shortfalls in sales.” In fact, the SEC charged, Newell misled investors, depriving them of “information relevant to an accurate and complete understanding of Newell’s actual sales trends.” Moreover, in Newell’s effort to manage revenues, what began as tinkering with an NGFM metastasized into problems with GAAP accounting. According to the Associate Director of Enforcement, the SEC found that “Newell’s former CEO issued an instruction to ‘scrub’ the company’s accruals after he learned that the company was projecting a ‘massive’ and ‘disappointing’ miss for the quarter….Senior executives of public companies hold positions of trust, and they risk abusing the duties attendant to their offices when they reach into a company’s accounting control processes as a way of making up for performance shortfalls.” Newell agreed to pay a civil penalty of $12.5 million and its CEO to pay $110,000.
Corp Fin posts new CDIs regarding pay versus performance
Corp Fin has posted some new CDIs on pay versus performance. In August last year, the SEC finally adopted a new rule requiring disclosure of information reflecting the relationship between executive compensation actually paid by a company and the company’s financial performance—a new rule that had been 12 years in the making, mandated in 2010 by Dodd-Frank. (See this PubCo post.) The final amendments added new Item 402(v) of Reg S-K, which requires companies to describe the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the company for the five most recently completed fiscal years (three for smaller reporting companies) in proxy or information statements in which executive compensation disclosure is required. Generally, for most companies, the new disclosures were first required for the 2023 proxy season. Apparently some issues cropped up, reflected in these new CDIs.
SEC charges GTT with disclosure failures and control violations
This press release announces settled charges brought by the SEC against GTT Communications, Inc., a multinational telecommunications and internet service provider, for failure to disclose material information about “unsupported adjustments of more than $35 million” that had the effect of reducing COR, i.e., cost of revenue, and increasing reported operating income by at least 15% in three quarters from 2019 through 2020. According to the Order, in 2017 and 2018, GTT rapidly expanded its business through multiple acquisitions, but had difficulty absorbing and integrating the operations of the acquired, sometimes distressed, companies, especially with regard to accounting and controls. As a result, GTT was never able to reconcile data from two critical operating systems used to determine COR, ultimately leading to data integrity issues in its financial statements. In an attempt to achieve some consistency between the two systems, the SEC alleged, the company began to make accounting adjustments that, in the absence of effective controls, were “highly uncertain” and devoid of proper support. Moreover, the SEC alleged, GTT failed to provide adequate disclosure about the adjustments. In addition to antifraud violations, the SEC charged GTT with control violations: although GTT knew that its systems were inadequate to accurately report COR, “GTT failed to implement and maintain policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that the COR reflected in GTT’s financial statements was based on reasonable support.” However, because of GTT’s prompt self-reporting, remedial measures and substantial cooperation, the SEC did not impose a civil penalty. But perhaps the real penalty can be found here: in 2021, GTT was delisted from the NYSE, terminated its Exchange Act registration and filed for bankruptcy. GTT emerged in 2022 as a private company owned by certain of its former creditors—but eligible to use “Fresh-Start Reporting.”
Investor Advisory Committee recommends human capital management disclosure
On Thursday last week, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee voted to approve, with two abstentions, a subcommittee recommendation regarding human capital management disclosure. You probably remember that, in 2020, during the tenure of then-SEC Chair Jay Clayton, the SEC adopted a new requirement to discuss human capital as part of an overhaul of Reg S-K that applied a “principles-based” approach. The new rule limited the requirement to a “description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons employed by the registrant, and any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the nature of the registrant’s business and workforce, measures or objectives that address the development, attraction and retention of personnel).” (See this PubCo post.) With workforce having grown in importance as a value driver, many viewed the amendment as a step in the right direction, but one that fell short. Subsequent reporting suggested that companies “capitalized on the fact that the new rule does not call for specific metrics,” as “[r]elatively few issuers provided meaningful numbers about their human capital, even when they had those numbers at hand” (although more recent studies have shown some expansion of disclosure). (See this PubCo post.) As you know, Corp Fin is currently working on a proposal to mandate enhanced company disclosures regarding HCM, and, according to the most recent Reg-Flex agenda, October is the target for issuance of the proposal. (See this PubCo post.) Recommendations from SEC advisory committees often hold some sway with the staff and the commissioners. Will the IAC recommendations have any impact?
SEC charges Fluor with improper accounting and inadequate internal accounting controls
In this Order, the SEC brought settled charges against Fluor Corporation, a global engineering, procurement and construction company listed on the NYSE, in connection with alleged improper accounting on two large-scale, fixed-price construction projects. Five current and former Fluor officers and employees were also charged. (The press release includes links to the orders for the five individuals.) Fixed-price contracts mean that cost overruns are the contractor’s problem, not the customer’s, and Fluor’s bids on the two projects were based on “overly optimistic cost and timing estimates.” When Fluor experienced cost overruns, the SEC alleged, Fluor’s internal accounting controls failed, with the result that Fluor used improper accounting for these projects that did not comply with the percentage-of-completion accounting method under GAAP, leading Fluor to materially overstate its net earnings for several annual and quarterly periods. A restatement ultimately followed. Fluor agreed to pay a civil penalty of $14.5 million and the officers to pay civil penalties between $15,000 and $25,000. According to the Associate Director in the Division of Enforcement, “[d]ependable estimates and the internal accounting controls that facilitate them are the backbone of percentage of completion accounting and are critical to the accuracy of the financial statements that investors rely on….We will continue to hold companies and individuals accountable for serious controls failures and resulting recordkeeping and reporting violations.”
Are springing penalties a thing? SEC charges Plug Power with accounting, reporting and control failures
In this Order, the SEC brought settled charges against Plug Power, Inc., a provider of green hydrogen and hydrogen-fuel-cell solutions, for financial reporting, accounting and controls failures in connection with a variety of the Company’s complex business transactions. The failures required Plug to restate its financial statements for several years. In the restatement, Company management identified a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting and ineffective disclosure controls and procedures, allegedly “due to Plug Power’s failure to maintain a sufficient complement of trained, knowledgeable personnel to execute their responsibilities for certain financial statement accounts and disclosures. Despite these control deficiencies, the Company raised over $5 billion from investors during the relevant Filing Period.” According to the SEC, Plug’s “material weakness in ICFR and ineffective DCP have not been fully remediated,” and the Company is continuing its remediation efforts. Plug agreed to pay a civil penalty of $1.25 million and to implement a number of undertakings, including an undertaking “to fully remediate the Company’s material weakness in ICFR and ineffective DCP within one year” of the SEC’s Order. Should Plug fail to comply with those undertakings, the Company will be required to pay a “springing penalty,” an additional civil penalty of $5 million.
SEC Chief Accountant warns against narrow focus in risk assessments
In this Statement, The Importance of a Comprehensive Risk Assessment by Auditors and Management, SEC Chief Accountant Paul Munter cautions auditors and company managements against conducting risk assessments that focus too narrowly “on information and risks that directly impact financial reporting, while disregarding broader, entity-level issues that may also impact financial reporting and internal controls.” Similarly, auditors and managements may sometimes dismiss isolated incidents, perhaps as a result of confirmation bias, without adequately analyzing whether these issues might be indicative of larger issues that require responsive action and disclosure. Munter warns that “[s]uch a narrow focus is detrimental to investors as it can result in material risks to the business going unaddressed and undisclosed, thereby diminishing the quality of financial information.” Management, Munter warns, must “take a holistic approach when assessing information about the business and avoid the potential bias toward evaluating problems as isolated incidents, in order to timely identify risks, including entity-level risks.” Managements and audit committees may want to take note.
SEC finds Forms 12b-25 not up to snuff
Earlier this week, the SEC announced settled enforcement actions against five companies for deficient disclosure in Forms 12b-25 that they filed regarding late reports. Why? On the heels of filing those Forms 12b-25, the companies announced financial restatements or corrections that were not even alluded to in those late notification filings. Over two years ago, the SEC charged eight companies for similar violations detected through the use of data analytics in an initiative aimed at Form 12b-25 filings that were soon followed by announcements of financial restatements or corrections. (See this PubCo post.) Apparently, the SEC believes that companies are still flubbing this one and does not seem to consider these errors to be just harmless foot faults. In connection with the 2021 enforcement actions, the Associate Director of Enforcement hit on a central problem from the SEC’s perspective with deficiencies of this type: “In these cases, due to the companies’ failure to include required disclosure in their Form 12b-25, investors relying on the deficient Forms NT were kept in the dark regarding the unreliability of the company’s financial reporting or anticipated material changes in operating results.” These charges should serve as a reminder that completing the late notification is not, to borrow a phrase, a trivial pursuit and could necessitate substantial time and attention to provide the narrative and quantitative data that, depending on the circumstances, could be required.
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