Category: Accounting and Auditing
The PCAOB suggests some questions for audit committee members
The PCAOB has posted a 2023 audit committee resource that identifies a number of questions that audit committees may want “to consider amongst themselves or in discussions with their independent auditors, particularly given today’s economic and geopolitical landscape.” The topics include the risk of fraud, risk assessment and internal controls, auditing and accounting risks, digital assets, M&A activities, use of the work of other auditors, talent and its impact on audit quality, independence, critical audit matters and cybersecurity. Audit committee members will certainly want to review the resource in its entirety, but, to give you a flavor, summarized below are some of the questions.
Some highlights of the 2023 PLI Securities Regulation Institute
This year’s PLI Securities Regulation Institute was a source for a lot of useful information and interesting perspectives. Panelists discussed a variety of topics, including climate disclosure (although no one shared any insights into the timing of the SEC’s final rules), proxy season issues, accounting issues, ESG and anti-ESG, and some of the most recent SEC rulemakings, such as pay versus performance, cybersecurity, buybacks and 10b5-1 plans. Some of the panels focused on these recent rulemakings echoed concerns expressed last year about the difficulty and complexity of implementation of these new rules, only this time, we also heard a few panelists questioning the rationale and effectiveness of these new mandates. What was the purpose of all this complication? Was it addressing real problems or just theoretical ones? Are investors really taking the disclosure into account? Is it all for naught? Pay versus performance, for example, was described as “a lot of work,” but, according to one of the program co-chairs, in terms of its impact, a “nothingburger.” (Was “nothingburger” the word of the week?) Aside from the agita over the need to implement the volume of complex rules, a key theme seemed to be the importance of controls and process—the need to have them, follow them and document that you followed them—as well as an intensified focus on cross-functional teams and avoiding silos. In addition, geopolitical uncertainty seems to be affecting just about everything. (For Commissioner Mark Uyeda’s perspective on the rulemaking process presented in his remarks before the Institute, see this PubCo post.) Below are just some of the takeaways, in no particular order.
Is there an alternative to Scope 3?
As you know, the SEC has proposed a sweeping set of regulations for disclosure on climate (see this PubCo post, this PubCo post and this PubCo post), and we anxiously wait to see what the final rules have in store (obviously not happening in October as the SEC had previously targeted). One controversial part of that proposal draws on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, requiring disclosure of a company’s Scopes 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions, and, for larger companies, Scope 3 GHG emissions if material (or included in the company’s emissions reduction target), with a phased-in attestation requirement for Scopes 1 and 2 data for large accelerated filers and accelerated filers. There haven’t been many complaints about the Scope 1 and Scope 2 requirements, but Scope 3 is another matter. According to the SEC, some commenters indicated that, for many companies, Scope 3 emissions represent a large proportion of overall GHG emissions, and therefore, could be material. However, those emissions result from the activities of third parties in the company’s “value chain,” making collection of the data much more difficult and much less reliable. In two articles published in the Harvard Business Review—“Accounting for Climate Change” and “We Need Better Carbon Accounting. Here’s How to Get There”—Robert Kaplan and Karthik Ramanna from Harvard Business School and the University of Oxford, respectively, propose another idea—the E-liability accounting system. The GHG protocol is, at this point, deeply embedded. Would the E-liability system work? Should the SEC or other regulators make room for a different concept?
Is political corruption securities fraud?
You remember Matt Levine’s mantra in his “Money Stuff” column on Bloomberg: “everything is securities fraud”? “You know the basic idea,” he says, a
“company does something bad, or something bad happens to it. Its stock price goes down, because of the bad thing. Shareholders sue: Doing the bad thing and not immediately telling shareholders about it, the shareholders say, is securities fraud. Even if the company does immediately tell shareholders about the bad thing, which is not particularly common, the shareholders might sue, claiming that the company failed to disclose the conditions and vulnerabilities that allowed the bad thing to happen. And so contributing to global warming is securities fraud, and sexual harassment by executives is securities fraud, and customer data breaches are securities fraud, and mistreating killer whales is securities fraud, and whatever else you’ve got. Securities fraud is a universal regulatory regime; anything bad that is done by or happens to a public company is also securities fraud, and it is often easier to punish the bad thing as securities fraud than it is to regulate it directly.” (Money Stuff, 6/26/19)
(See this PubCo post.) But here’s a new one—bribery and political corruption as securities fraud. As described in this press release, in the fiscal-year-end enforcement crush, the SEC brought settled charges against Exelon Corporation, a utility services holding company, and its subsidiary, electric utility company Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), and filed a complaint against ComEd’s former CEO alleging “fraud in connection with a multi-year scheme to corruptly influence and reward the then-Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives.” Exelon and ComEd agreed to settle the charges, with Exelon paying a civil penalty of $46.2 million. The charges against the CEO are headed for trial. So how is this securities fraud? According to the Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Public Finance Abuse Unit, the CEO’s “remarks to investors about ComEd’s lobbying efforts hid the reality of the long-running political corruption scheme in which they were engaged….When corporate executives speak to investors, they must not mislead by omission.”
SEC charges executives with fraudulent revenue recognition practices
As part of its fiscal-year-end enforcement surge, the SEC filed charges against three former executives of Pareteum Corporation, a telecommunications and cloud software company, for fraudulent revenue recognition practices—a settled action against the former controller and a complaint against the former CFO and former Chief Commercial Officer (also, formerly CEO). As described in the complaint, the SEC charged the former executives with orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to overstate revenue by recording revenue from non-binding purchase orders and concealing the practice from the company’s auditors. From 2018 through mid-2019, the SEC alleged, the defendants’ improper revenue recognition practices resulted in the company’s overstating revenue by “approximately $12 million for fiscal year 2018 (60% of the ultimately restated revenue), and by approximately $30 million for the first and second quarters of 2019 (91% of the ultimately restated revenue).” In addition, the former CFO, the SEC charged, did not establish sufficient internal accounting controls to assess whether revenue should be recognized under GAAP. According to the press release, Pareteum previously settled with the SEC on accounting and disclosure fraud charges in 2021 and filed for bankruptcy in 2022. Notably, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY has announced parallel criminal charges against the former CFO and CCO. According to the Associate Director of Enforcement for the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office, as the SEC alleged in its complaint, “Pareteum’s executives artificially inflated Pareteum’s revenue numbers to create the illusion of robust revenue growth….Investors should be able to trust public companies to issue truthful and accurate financial statements, and we will hold accountable any executives who abuse that trust and defraud investors.”
SEC charges Newell with misleading disclosure and control failures
In this settled action, the SEC charged Newell Brands and its former CEO with providing misleading disclosure about a prominently featured non-GAAP financial measure—“core sales,” a key NGFM that Newell portrayed as providing “a more complete understanding of underlying sales trends.” As described in the Order and press release, Newell and its CEO took a number of actions—reclassifications, accrual reductions, order pull-forwards—that increased “core sales” growth, but the resulting increases “were out of step with Newell’s actual but undisclosed sales trends, allowing the company to announce ‘strong’ or ‘solid’ results in quarters it internally described as disappointing due to shortfalls in sales.” In fact, the SEC charged, Newell misled investors, depriving them of “information relevant to an accurate and complete understanding of Newell’s actual sales trends.” Moreover, in Newell’s effort to manage revenues, what began as tinkering with an NGFM metastasized into problems with GAAP accounting. According to the Associate Director of Enforcement, the SEC found that “Newell’s former CEO issued an instruction to ‘scrub’ the company’s accruals after he learned that the company was projecting a ‘massive’ and ‘disappointing’ miss for the quarter….Senior executives of public companies hold positions of trust, and they risk abusing the duties attendant to their offices when they reach into a company’s accounting control processes as a way of making up for performance shortfalls.” Newell agreed to pay a civil penalty of $12.5 million and its CEO to pay $110,000.
Corp Fin posts new CDIs regarding pay versus performance
Corp Fin has posted some new CDIs on pay versus performance. In August last year, the SEC finally adopted a new rule requiring disclosure of information reflecting the relationship between executive compensation actually paid by a company and the company’s financial performance—a new rule that had been 12 years in the making, mandated in 2010 by Dodd-Frank. (See this PubCo post.) The final amendments added new Item 402(v) of Reg S-K, which requires companies to describe the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the company for the five most recently completed fiscal years (three for smaller reporting companies) in proxy or information statements in which executive compensation disclosure is required. Generally, for most companies, the new disclosures were first required for the 2023 proxy season. Apparently some issues cropped up, reflected in these new CDIs.
SEC charges GTT with disclosure failures and control violations
This press release announces settled charges brought by the SEC against GTT Communications, Inc., a multinational telecommunications and internet service provider, for failure to disclose material information about “unsupported adjustments of more than $35 million” that had the effect of reducing COR, i.e., cost of revenue, and increasing reported operating income by at least 15% in three quarters from 2019 through 2020. According to the Order, in 2017 and 2018, GTT rapidly expanded its business through multiple acquisitions, but had difficulty absorbing and integrating the operations of the acquired, sometimes distressed, companies, especially with regard to accounting and controls. As a result, GTT was never able to reconcile data from two critical operating systems used to determine COR, ultimately leading to data integrity issues in its financial statements. In an attempt to achieve some consistency between the two systems, the SEC alleged, the company began to make accounting adjustments that, in the absence of effective controls, were “highly uncertain” and devoid of proper support. Moreover, the SEC alleged, GTT failed to provide adequate disclosure about the adjustments. In addition to antifraud violations, the SEC charged GTT with control violations: although GTT knew that its systems were inadequate to accurately report COR, “GTT failed to implement and maintain policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that the COR reflected in GTT’s financial statements was based on reasonable support.” However, because of GTT’s prompt self-reporting, remedial measures and substantial cooperation, the SEC did not impose a civil penalty. But perhaps the real penalty can be found here: in 2021, GTT was delisted from the NYSE, terminated its Exchange Act registration and filed for bankruptcy. GTT emerged in 2022 as a private company owned by certain of its former creditors—but eligible to use “Fresh-Start Reporting.”
Investor Advisory Committee recommends human capital management disclosure
On Thursday last week, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee voted to approve, with two abstentions, a subcommittee recommendation regarding human capital management disclosure. You probably remember that, in 2020, during the tenure of then-SEC Chair Jay Clayton, the SEC adopted a new requirement to discuss human capital as part of an overhaul of Reg S-K that applied a “principles-based” approach. The new rule limited the requirement to a “description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons employed by the registrant, and any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the nature of the registrant’s business and workforce, measures or objectives that address the development, attraction and retention of personnel).” (See this PubCo post.) With workforce having grown in importance as a value driver, many viewed the amendment as a step in the right direction, but one that fell short. Subsequent reporting suggested that companies “capitalized on the fact that the new rule does not call for specific metrics,” as “[r]elatively few issuers provided meaningful numbers about their human capital, even when they had those numbers at hand” (although more recent studies have shown some expansion of disclosure). (See this PubCo post.) As you know, Corp Fin is currently working on a proposal to mandate enhanced company disclosures regarding HCM, and, according to the most recent Reg-Flex agenda, October is the target for issuance of the proposal. (See this PubCo post.) Recommendations from SEC advisory committees often hold some sway with the staff and the commissioners. Will the IAC recommendations have any impact?
SEC charges Fluor with improper accounting and inadequate internal accounting controls
In this Order, the SEC brought settled charges against Fluor Corporation, a global engineering, procurement and construction company listed on the NYSE, in connection with alleged improper accounting on two large-scale, fixed-price construction projects. Five current and former Fluor officers and employees were also charged. (The press release includes links to the orders for the five individuals.) Fixed-price contracts mean that cost overruns are the contractor’s problem, not the customer’s, and Fluor’s bids on the two projects were based on “overly optimistic cost and timing estimates.” When Fluor experienced cost overruns, the SEC alleged, Fluor’s internal accounting controls failed, with the result that Fluor used improper accounting for these projects that did not comply with the percentage-of-completion accounting method under GAAP, leading Fluor to materially overstate its net earnings for several annual and quarterly periods. A restatement ultimately followed. Fluor agreed to pay a civil penalty of $14.5 million and the officers to pay civil penalties between $15,000 and $25,000. According to the Associate Director in the Division of Enforcement, “[d]ependable estimates and the internal accounting controls that facilitate them are the backbone of percentage of completion accounting and are critical to the accuracy of the financial statements that investors rely on….We will continue to hold companies and individuals accountable for serious controls failures and resulting recordkeeping and reporting violations.”
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