Category: administrative law

SCOTUS overrules Chevron—a gut punch to the administrative state?

On Friday, SCOTUS issued its decision in two very important cases, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Dept of Commerce, about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the authority to require Atlantic herring fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance. To be sure, the transcendent significance of these cases has little to do with fishing and everything to do with the authority of administrative agencies to regulate: the question presented to SCOTUS was whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies. The doctrine of Chevron deference mandates that, if a statute does not directly address the “precise question at issue” or if there is ambiguity in how to interpret the statute, courts must accept an agency’s “permissible” (think, “reasonable”) interpretation of a law unless it is arbitrary or manifestly contrary to the statute. In a majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court rejected the doctrine: the “deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the [Administrative Procedure Act].” In case you scoff at the significance of the decision, consider the seminal nature of the doctrine as described in this 2006 article by Cass Sunstein: Chevron “has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text—the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative agencies. Ironically, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, had no broad ambitions for the decision; the Court did not mean to do anything dramatic. But shortly after it appeared, Chevron was quickly taken to establish a new approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law, going so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state.” Alluding to language from Marbury, Sunstein proclaimed that “Chevron seemed to declare that in the face of ambiguity, it is emphatically the province and duty of the administrative department to say what the law is.”  Not anymore. A six-justice majority of the Court has just overruled Chevron, with concurrences by each of Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch and a dissent by Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson (only on Relentless). The implications of the decision are almost boundless—every current and future federal regulatory regime could be affected. As Kagan wrote in her dissent, this decision “puts courts at the apex of the administrative process as to every conceivable subject—because there are always gaps and ambiguities in regulatory statutes, and often of great import. What actions can be taken to address climate change or other environmental challenges? What will the Nation’s health-care system look like in the coming decades? Or the financial or transportation systems? What rules are going to constrain the development of A.I.?  In every sphere of current or future federal regulation, expect courts from now on to play a commanding role.”

Atlantic herring get their day in court—does it spell the end of Chevron deference?

On Wednesday, SCOTUS heard oral argument—for over three and a half hours—in two very important cases, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Dept of Commerce, about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the authority to require Atlantic herring fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance. And they’re important because… why? Because one of the questions presented to SCOTUS was whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies.  The doctrine of Chevron deference mandates that, if a statute does not directly address the “precise question at issue” or if there is ambiguity in how to interpret the statute, courts must accept an agency’s permissible interpretation of a law unless it is arbitrary or manifestly contrary to the statute. Of course, the  conservative members of the Court have long signaled their desire to rein in the dreaded “administrative state,” especially when agencies are advancing regulations that conservative judges perceive as too “nanny state.” And overruling Chevron is one way to do just that.  (See, for example, the dissent of Chief Justice John Roberts in City of Arlington v. FCC  back in 2013, where he worried that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed,” not to mention the concurring opinion of Justice Neil Gorsuch in the 2016 case, Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, where he referred to Chevron as an “elephant in the room” that permits “executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power.” And then there’s Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s 2016 article, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, in which he argues that Chevron is a “judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the Executive Branch.”  See the SideBars below.)  But, in recent past cases, SCOTUS has resolved issues without addressing Chevron, looking instead to theories such as  the “major questions” doctrine. (See this PubCo post.) The two cases now before the Court, however, may well present that long-sought opportunity. Depending on the outcome, their impact could be felt far beyond the Marine Fisheries Service at many other agencies, including the SEC and the FDA. Will we soon be seeing a dramatically different sort of administrative state? To me, it seemed pretty clear from the oral argument that SCOTUS is likely to jettison or significantly erode Chevron. Among the most conservative justices at least, there didn’t seem to be a lot of interest in half-measures—been there, done that. (The concept of the Court’s limiting its decision to whether statutory silence should be treated as ambiguity, as some had hoped, did not even come up for serious discussion.) But what approach the Court might take—overrule Chevron with no alternative framework suggested, adopt a version of “weak deference” as outlined in a 1944 case,  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., or possibly even “Kisorize” (as they termed it) Chevron by imposing some serious limitations, as in Kisor v. Wilkie—that remains to be seen.

Future of SEC’s ALJs looks bleak—but the administrative state? Not so much

Last week, SCOTUS heard oral argument in Jarkesy v. SEC (BTW, pronounced Járk?z?, according to his counsel).  As you may have heard, that case is about the constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative law judges. There were three questions presented, and Jarkesy had been successful in the appellate court on all three:

“1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.   

 2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.   

 3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.”

While, on its face, the case may not have much allure, it has the potential to be enormously important in limiting the power of the SEC and other federal agencies. That’s especially true if SCOTUS broadly decides that the statute granting authority to the SEC to elect to use ALJs violates the nondelegation doctrine. This case, together with the two cases to be heard in January addressing the continued viability of Chevron deference (see this PubCo post), could go far to upend the “administrative state.” And, for those justices with a well-known antipathy to the administrative state, that might be their ultimate goal. (See, for example, the dissent of Chief Justice Roberts in City of Arlington v. FCC (2013), where he worried that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”) During the over two-hour oral argument, however, the discussion was focused almost entirely on the question of whether the SEC’s use of an ALJ deprived Jarkesy of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial—certainly an important issue with possibly far-reaching implications across federal agencies. But what was most conspicuous—and perhaps most consequential—was what was not discussed: the nondelegation doctrine. In case I missed it, I searched the 170-page transcript and found the word “nondelegation” only once and that from the lips of SEC counsel. While, at the end of the day, the Court’s opinion could certainly go in a different direction, the oral argument did not leave the impression that the end of the administrative state is nigh—not as result of this case, at least.

Relentless Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce: SCOTUS grants cert. to another case about Atlantic herring—and Chevron deference

On October 13, SCOTUS granted cert. in the case of Relentless, Inc. v. Dept of Commerce, a case about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service has the authority to require herring fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance.  Does that ring a bell?  Probably, because it’s exactly the same issue on which SCOTUS has already granted cert. in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. (See this PubCo post.) Why grant cert. in this case too?  It’s been widely reported that the reason was to allow Justice Kenji Brown Jackson, who had recused herself on Loper Bright, to participate in what will likely be a very important decision: whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies (such as the National Marine Fisheries Service or, as has happened fairly often, the SEC, see this Cooley News Brief). The question presented is “ [w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.” The decision could narrow, or even completely undo, that deference. The grant of cert provided that the two cases will be argued in tandem in the January 2024 argument session. Mark your calendars.

NAM seeks to challenge Rule 14a-8 regulatory process for shareholder proposals

You might recall that this past proxy season witnessed a significant number of shareholder proposals related to ESG—from both sides of the aisle. (See this PubCo post.)  One of those proposals was submitted by the National Center for Public Policy Research to The Kroger Co., which operates supermarkets, regarding the omission of consideration of “viewpoint” and “ideology” from its equal employment opportunity policy. Kroger sought to exclude the proposal as “ordinary business” under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and Corp Fin concurred. After Corp Fin and the SEC refused reconsideration of the decision, the NCPPR petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review. Now, the National Association of Manufacturers has requested, and been granted, leave to intervene in the case, claiming that neither the federal securities laws nor the First Amendment allows the SEC to use Rule 14a-8 to compel companies to speak about contentious political or social issues, such as abortion, climate change, diversity or gun control, that are “unrelated to its core business or the creation of shareholder value.”  That is, NAM isn’t just arguing about Corp Fin’s greenlighting of the exclusion of NCPPR’s proposal—in fact, NAM agrees that “Kroger should not be forced to include petitioners’ policy proposal in Kroger’s proxy statement.”  Rather, NAM is upping the ante considerably by challenging whether the SEC has any business “dictat[ing] the content of public company proxy ballots and the topics on which shareholders are required to cast votes.”  According to NAM’s Chief Legal Officer, “[m]anufacturers are facing an onslaught of activists seeking to hijack the proxy ballot to advance narrow political agendas, and the SEC has become a willing partner in the effort. The corporate proxy ballot is not the appropriate venue for policy decisions better made by America’s elected representatives, and manufacturers are regularly caught in the middle as activists on the left and the right bring fights from the political arena into the boardroom.”

Will Chevron deference survive? Why you might really care about a case about fishing

On May 1, SCOTUS granted cert in the case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a case about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service has the authority to require fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance. So why is this relevant to public companies? Because one of the questions presented to SCOTUS was whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies (such as the SEC). The doctrine of Chevron deference, articulated in that case, mandated that, if there is ambiguity in how to interpret a statute, courts must accept an agency’s interpretation of a law unless it is arbitrary or manifestly contrary to the statute. The decision, expected next term, could narrow, or even completely undo, that deference. Of course, the  conservative members of the Court have long signaled their desire to rein in the dreaded “administrative state.”  (See, for example, the dissent of Chief Justice John Roberts in City of Arlington v. FCC  back in 2013, where he worried that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”) But, in recent past cases, the Court has resolved issues and avoided addressing Chevron. This case, however, may well present that long-sought opportunity. Depending on the outcome, its impact could be felt far beyond the Marine Fisheries Service at many other agencies, including the SEC.

West Virginia v. EPA: SCOTUS gives its imprimatur to the “major questions” doctrine, shaking up the “administrative state”

West Virginia v EPA, the next-to-final decision handed down by SCOTUS this term, is a significant decision regarding a rule that the EPA said was never even in effect, that it had no intention of enforcing and that it planned to later replace with a new still-to-be-developed rule.  As the NYT phrased it, “it’s a case about a regulation that doesn’t exist.” (Sort of like an episode of Seinfeld—the show about nothing—except that it’s not the least bit funny.) So SCOTUS could have stopped right there, but the Court forged ahead—an indicator by itself—with a decision that is nevertheless shaking up administrative law and the extent of rulemaking authority that federal agencies have—or thought they had.  Its impact will likely be felt, not just at the EPA, but also at many other agencies, including the SEC.  Of course, the  conservative members of the Court have long signaled their desire to rein in the dreaded “administrative state.” (See, for example, the dissent of Chief Justice John Roberts in City of Arlington v. FCC  back in 2013, where he worried that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”) With this new decision by the Chief Justice (joined by five other justices), that desire has now been sated—for a while at least.  In the majority opinion, SCOTUS declared that this case “is a major questions case,” referring to a judicially created doctrine holding that courts must be “skeptical” of agency efforts to assert broad authority to regulate matters of “vast economic and political significance,” requiring, in those instances, that the agency “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ to regulate.’” In addition to the blow that the decision deals to climate regulation—“Court  Decision Leaves Biden With Few Tools to Combat Climate Change,” is one of the headlines from the NYT—we can now expect the major questions doctrine to be brandished regularly against significant agency regulations across the board, and, with Congress perpetually at loggerheads and limited in its ability to authorize much of anything these days, it could well stymie much agency rulemaking. Does anyone question that, with SCOTUS’s new imprimatur, the doctrine will be raised in anticipated litigation against whatever version of the SEC’s climate disclosure regulation is adopted? As reported by Reuters, when asked  by Bloomberg TV on Thursday about the impact of the decision on other agencies, Senator Patrick Toomey “singled out the SEC rule,” claiming that the SEC is “attempting to impose this whole climate change disclosure regime…with no authority from Congress to do that.” To better understand the major questions doctrine, it may be useful to take a closer look at the case.