Category: Corporate Governance
New Statement on Key Reminders for Audit Committees
Yesterday, SEC Chair Jay Clayton, SEC Chief Accountant Sagar Teotia and Corp Fin Director William Hinman posted a “Statement on Role of Audit Committees in Financial Reporting and Key Reminders Regarding Oversight Responsibilities.” As the year draws to a close, given the vital role of audit committees in the financial reporting system, the Statement is intended to provide “observations and reminders on a number of potential areas of focus for audit committees. Issuers and independent auditors also should be mindful of these considerations with an eye toward ensuring that audit committees have the resources and support they need to fulfill their obligations.”
Happy New Year Everyone!
SEC proposes to amend auditor independence rules
Recently, SEC Chief Accountant Sagar Teotia hinted at possible forthcoming changes to the auditor independence rules, remarking that, in connection with the recent changes related to lending relationships, the SEC “also received comments on other aspects of auditor independence rules. In conjunction with that feedback, the Chairman directed the staff to formulate recommendations to the Commission for possible additional changes to the auditor independence rules for potential rulemaking.” However, the nature of the potential changes remained something of a mystery. The proposal to amend the auditor independence rules has now been released. According to the press release issued today, the proposal is intended to modernize aspects of the independence rules to minimize the potential for “relationships and services that would not pose threats to an auditor’s objectivity and impartiality [to] trigger non-substantive rule breaches or potentially time consuming audit committee review of non-substantive matters.” It is important to keep in mind that violations of the auditor independence rules can have serious consequences not only for the audit firm, but also for the audit client. For example, an independence violation may cause the auditor to withdraw its audit report, requiring the audit client to have a re-audit by another audit firm. As a result, in most cases, inquiry into the topic of auditor independence should be a menu item on the audit committee’s plate. The comment period will be open for 60 days.
How will companies and CEOs meet the challenges of corporate social responsibility?
This PubCo post discussing the Business Roundtable’s adoption of a new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation concluded by observing (rhetorically) that the question teed up by the new BRT Statement was what all of the signatories would actually do to fulfill the commitments in the Statement. Apparently, some NGOs are now asking that question for real, and, ironically, one of the first recipients is a well-known leader of the pack on commitments to all stakeholders.
What’s on the SEC’s new fall 2019 agenda?
SEC Chair Jay Clayton has streamlined the Regulatory Flexibility Act Agenda to limit it to the rulemakings that the SEC actually expects to take up in the subsequent period. Clayton has previously said that the short-term agenda signifies rulemakings that the SEC actually plans to pursue in the following 12 months. (See this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) The SEC’s Fall 2019 short-term and long-term agendas have now been posted, reflecting priorities as of August 7, the date on which the SEC’s staff completed compilation of the data. Items on the short- and long-term agendas are discussed below.
Watchdog calls for investigation of “fishy” letters
In November, the SEC voted to propose amendments to add new disclosure and engagement requirements for proxy advisory firms and to “modernize” the shareholder proposal rules by increasing the eligibility and resubmission thresholds. (See this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) At the SEC open meeting, in explaining his perspective on the proposals, SEC Chair Jay Clayton indicated that, following the SEC’s proxy process roundtable (see this PubCo post), the SEC had received hundreds of comment letters, but there were seven letters that were most striking to him. Clayton seemed to be genuinely moved by these letters, ostensibly submitted by various Main Street investors, a group that Clayton considers to be core to the SEC’s protective mission. (See this PubCo post.) But, according to Bloomberg, there was something not quite right—something “fishy”—about those letters. (See this PubCo post.) Now, Bloomberg reports, a Democratic watchdog group is calling for an investigation into what is behind the “fishy” letters. And, as reported in this Bloomberg article, Clayton has said that the SEC is investigating.
How does the public view executive comp?
How many people have strong opinions about most hot topics in corporate governance— staggered boards, proxy advisory firms or dual-class share structure? In Pay for Performance… But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO Pay, from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford, the authors take a look at a corporate governance subject on which everyone seems to have an opinion—CEO pay—and the public’s perceptions about it. While academics may be arguing about labor market efficiency, much of the public takes a more intuitive or pragmatic approach: “the issue of CEO pay boils down to a personal assessment of whether any executive deserves to be paid so much money.” The authors’ conclusion from the survey: “the disconnect between observed pay levels and the public’s view of pay is stark.” Overall, the survey results were quite fascinating.
Jackson advocates transparency in political spending—by corporations and institutional investors
In July, Representative Carolyn Maloney contacted SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson to solicit his views on legislation that would require public companies to disclose their corporate political spending. Jackson has now responded. In his view, the absence of transparency about political spending has led to a lack of accountability, allowing executives to “spend shareholder money on politics in a way that serves the interests of insiders, not investors.” But because investors typically put their money into mutual funds and other similar investment vehicles, their voting rights are typically exercised, not by the investors themselves, but instead by these institutions on their behalf—and most often not in sync with the surveyed preferences of investors: “while ordinary investors overwhelmingly favor transparency in this area, the biggest institutions consistently vote their shares to keep political spending in the dark.” And, he charges, it’s not just corporations that are opaque about their own political spending—institutional investors are likewise opaque about their votes against shareholder proposals for spending disclosure.
NYSE proposes allowing primary direct listings—will the rule change also be a game changer?
The NYSE has filed with the SEC a proposed rule change that would allow companies going public to raise capital through a primary direct listing. Under current NYSE rules, only secondary sales are permitted in a direct listing. As a result, thus far, companies that have embarked on direct listings have been more of the unicorn variety, where the company was not necessarily in need of additional capital. If approved by the SEC, will the new proposal be a game changer for the traditional underwritten IPO?
Did the SEC Chair get punked?
You might recall that, earlier this month, the SEC voted to propose amendments to add new disclosure and engagement requirements for proxy advisory firms and to “modernize” the shareholder proposal rules by increasing the eligibility and resubmission thresholds. (See this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) At the SEC open meeting, in explaining his perspective on the proposals, SEC Chair Jay Clayton indicated that, following the SEC’s proxy process roundtable (see this PubCo post), the SEC had received hundreds of comment letters, but there were seven letters that were most striking to him. Clayton seemed to be genuinely moved by these letters, ostensibly submitted by various Main Street investors, a group that Clayton considers to be core to the SEC’s protective mission. (See this PubCo post.) But, according to Bloomberg, there’s something not quite right—something “fishy”—about those letters. To borrow a phrase, did Clayton get punked?
Should CFOs serve on outside boards?
When a company’s CFO serves on another company’s board, does it help or hurt the financial reporting of the CFO’s company? It’s easy to imagine that the time commitment associated with outside board service would be a distraction from the CFO’s primary job and ultimately impair the CFO’s performance—especially since, as reported in CFO.com, a majority of finance chiefs on outside boards are appointed to the time-consuming audit committee. But, according to an academic study, “CFO Outside Directorship and Financial Misstatements,” just published in Accounting Horizons, a peer-reviewed journal of the American Accounting Association (link is to a version on SSRN), that’s not the case. In fact, the study demonstrated that outside board service can actually enhance the quality of the financial reporting of the CFO’s company.
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