Category: ESG
Court calls a halt to Exxon case against Arjuna
In January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. Then, the two proponents notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal and promised not to refile; therefore, they said, the case was moot. But Exxon refused to withdraw its complaint because it believed that there was still a critical live controversy for the Court to resolve. And the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed—at least as to Arjuna. While the Court dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, it allowed the case against Arjuna to proceed on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, citing precedent that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” (For background on this case, see this PubCo post.) According to the Court, the “voluntary-cessation doctrine requires more than platitudes to render a case moot;…to moot Exxon’s claim, Defendants must show that it is ‘absolutely clear’ the relevant conduct ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” But the argument continued, even after the decision was rendered, as Arjuna continued to submit letters to Exxon in which Arjuna “unconditionally and irrevocably covenant[ed] to refrain henceforth from submitting any proposal for consideration by Exxon shareholders relating to GHG or climate change,” and Exxon continued to contend that the letters were not enough. (See this PubCo post.) Finally, yesterday, after a hearing on the matter, the Court called a halt, issuing an Order that Exxon’s claim was moot and dismissing the action without prejudice. But not before the Court got in a few digs at Arjuna, activism and even at the SEC.
What does the Nasdaq board diversity data tell us?
As you know, the Nasdaq board diversity disclosure requirements might be in jeopardy at the moment, as we await the decision of the en banc Fifth Circuit following oral argument in Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment and National Center for Public Policy Research v. SEC. As noted in this PubCo post, the discussion at oral argument seemed to be dominated by rule skeptics. Notwithstanding the possibility that the rules might be overturned—or perhaps because they might be—the folks at Bloomberg Law have used the opportunity to analyze some of the data from those disclosures, offering a glimpse into the current state of corporate board diversity among the over 4,000 Nasdaq-listed companies. What is the bottom line? The authors found that “companies have diversified their boards in part by predominantly hiring white women—meeting the rule’s gender-based requirements—but falling short when it comes to other demographics.”
What happened with no-action requests this proxy season?
According to “SEC No Action Statistics to May 1, 2024” from the Shareholder Rights Group, this proxy season, the SEC staff “has nearly doubled the number of exclusions” of shareholder proposals compared with 2023; that is, relative to the prior year, the staff has issued almost twice the number of letters indicating that it would not recommend enforcement action if the company excluded the proposal from its proxy statement. While that surge reflects primarily a “sharp increase” in the number of requests for no-action filed by companies, importantly, the article indicates that it also reflects an increase in the relative proportion of no-action requests granted. From November 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024, the article reports, the SEC has granted company requests for no-action regarding shareholder proposals about 68% of the time (excluding requests withdrawn), compared with 56% at the same point last year. Notably, the article reports, that percentage (68%) is fairly comparable to the average exclusion rate (69%) during the prior administration (2017 to 2020). Since the issuance of SLB 14L in 2021, the staff has come in for criticism for applying a revised approach to evaluating no-action requests that some market participants considered perhaps a bit too generous to proponents of proposals, leading to an excess of overly prescriptive proposals presented at shareholder meetings. As the article suggests, has this criticism led to a moderation of that approach?
NRDC and Sierra Club seek exit from SEC climate disclosure litigation
You might recall that the litigation over the SEC’s climate disclosure rules (see, e.g., this PubCo post) was not limited to those, like the Chamber of Commerce, Liberty Energy and the State of Iowa, challenging the SEC’s authority to adopt the rules, but also included some environmental groups—the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council—which affirmed the SEC’s authority, but contended that, in rolling back the proposal, the SEC had “fallen short of its statutory mandate to protect investors.” In particular, they were disturbed by the removal in the final rules of requirements to disclose Scope 3 emissions. (See this PubCo post.) Now, both the NRDC and the Sierra Club have moved to voluntarily dismiss their petitions for review..
Exxon persists in battle against Arjuna
When we last checked in on the ExxonMobil litigation against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This—in which Exxon sought a declaratory judgment that it may exclude the two defendants’ proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement—the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas had just dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, but allowed the case against Arjuna to proceed on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. (For background on this case, see this PubCo post.) The two proponents had contended that, because Arjuna and Follow This had withdrawn their proposal and promised not to refile, there was no live case or controversy. As a result, they asserted, Exxon’s claim was moot, and the Court had no subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court held that Exxon had the “winning argument,” citing precedent that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” According to the court, the “voluntary-cessation doctrine requires more than platitudes to render a case moot;…to moot Exxon’s claim, Defendants must show that it is ‘absolutely clear’ the relevant conduct ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” After the decision was rendered, Arjuna submitted a letter to Exxon in which Arjuna “unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain henceforth from submitting any proposal for consideration by Exxon shareholders relating to GHG or climate change.” End of story? Not quite.
Exxon court challenge to Arjuna shareholder proposal survives dismissal [updated]
You may recall that, in January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. Then, the two proponents notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal. End of story? Hardly. In a status update filed in February, Exxon explained that it would not withdraw the complaint because it believed that there was still a critical live controversy for the Court to resolve. Arjuna and Follow This both moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas has just issued its opinion: the Court dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the case against Arjuna survives on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Arjuna has now responded by letter. However, this conflict isn’t just about Exxon and two small activist shareholders. It has taken on much larger proportions: some business groups have joined with Exxon to bemoan the “hijacking” by special interest groups of Rule 14a-8 to “advance their preferred social policies” and “inundate public corporations with proposals designed to push ideological agendas.” Others have questioned whether, under the First Amendment, the SEC, through Rule 14a-8, has the right to compel companies to use their proxy statements to speak about contentious political issues. On the other side, some investors lament Exxon’s “aggressive tactics” that threaten to “diminish the role—and the rights—of every investor.” Stay tuned on this one.
Dubious en banc Fifth Circuit hears oral argument on Nasdaq board diversity rules
In August 2021, the SEC approved a Nasdaq proposal for new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure, accompanied by a proposal to provide free access to a board recruiting service. The new listing rules adopted a “comply or explain” mandate for board diversity for most listed companies and required companies listed on Nasdaq’s U.S. exchange to publicly disclose “consistent, transparent diversity statistics” regarding the composition of their boards. (See this PubCo post.) It didn’t take long for a court challenge to these rules to materialize: the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment and, later, the National Center for Public Policy Research petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—the Alliance has its principal place of business in Texas—for review of the SEC’s final order approving the Nasdaq rule. (See this PubCo post and this PubCo post) In October 2023, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit denied those petitions, in effect upholding Nasdaq’s board diversity listing rules. Given that, by repute, the Fifth Circuit is the circuit of choice for advocates of conservative causes, the decision to deny the petition may have taken some by surprise—unless, that is, they were aware, as discussed in the WSJ and Reuters, that the three judges on this panel happened to all be appointed by Democrats. Petitioners then filed a petition requesting a rehearing en banc by the Fifth Circuit, where Republican presidents have appointed 12 of the 16 active judges. (See this PubCo post.) Not that politics has anything to do with it, of course. That petition for rehearing en banc was granted, vacating the opinion of the lower court. Yesterday, oral argument was heard. Let’s just say that, while some points were made in support of the rule, the discussion seemed to be dominated by rule skeptics. But the feud between Drake and Kendrick Lamar did figure in the discussion. Some highlights below.
Cooley Alert: EU Adopts Mandatory Rules on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence
In late April, the European Parliament voted to adopt the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which will apply to EU companies and to non-EU companies with activities in the EU that meet specified thresholds. A discussed in this new Cooley Alert, EU Adopts Mandatory Rules on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence That Will Apply to Many US Companies, from Cooley’s International ESG and Sustainability Advisory team, the CSDDD could turn out to be a “heavy lift” for many in-scope companies: the new law will mandate, for the first time, comprehensive “human rights and environmental due diligence obligations, with significant financial penalties and civil liability for companies that do not fully comply,” as well as new requirements for companies “to adopt and put into effect a climate transition plan” and “to report on their due diligence processes.” As the Alert observes, these requirements “reframe existing international soft laws”—UN Guiding Principles and OECD guidelines—as “mandatory obligations.”
Is ESG a “must have” only in boom-times?
Not so long ago, zeal for corporate action on ESG was skyrocketing. Now? Not so much. What happened? Many have attributed the decline in appetite for ESG to the politicization of ESG and particularly to ESG backlash. This paper from the Rock Center for Corporate governance at Stanford has another idea. Has “ESG enthusiasm” reached its expiration date or, as the paper posits, is it like an alligator Birkin bag, just a luxury—something to pursue only when you’re “feeling flush”? In economics, the authors explain, demand for most items declines as prices increase. Not so with luxury goods, where “a high price tag stimulates demand in part because of the social benefits the purchaser receives by signaling to others their ability to afford it.” Demand for luxury goods often rises and falls with the economy; when times are prosperous, demand for luxury goods increases and when money is tight, demand falls. In that light, a “case can be made,” the authors contend, “that ESG is a luxury good.”
Is the proxy advisory industry a net benefit or cost to shareholders?
In Seven Questions About Proxy Advisors, from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford, the authors, David Larcker and Brian Tayan, examine the proxy advisory firm industry—all two of them. Well, actually, as the paper observes, there are a large number of small players, but Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis “control[] almost the entire market.” It’s well-known that recommendations from ISS and GL are considered important—sometimes even a major aspect of the battle—especially in contests for corporate control and director elections. But, the authors point out, the extent of their influence on “voting outcomes and corporate choices is not established, nor is the role they play in the market. Are proxy advisory firms information intermediaries (that digest and distill proxy data), issue spotters (that highlight matters deserving closer scrutiny), or standard setters (that influence corporate choices through their guidelines and models)? Because of the uncertainty around these questions, disagreement exists whether their influence is beneficial, benign, or harmful. Defenders of proxy advisors tout them as advocates for shareholder democracy, while detractors fashion them as unaccountable standard setters.” The paper examines “seven important questions about the role, influence and effectiveness of proxy advisory firms.” The authors explore why there is so much controversy about the purpose, role and contribution of proxy advisory firms, asking whether “the proxy advisory industry—as currently structured—[is] a net benefit or cost to shareholders?”
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