You might recall that, in April of this year, SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson co-authored an op-ed (with Robert Pozen, MIT senior lecturer and former president of Fidelity) that lambasted the use of non-GAAP financial metrics in determining executive pay, absent more transparent disclosure. The pair argued that, although historically, performance targets were based on GAAP, in recent years, there has been a shift to using non-GAAP pay targets, sometimes involving significant adjustments that can “be used to justify outsize compensation for disappointing results.” On the heels of that op-ed came a rulemaking petition submitted by the Council of Institutional Investors requesting, in light of this increased prevalence, that the SEC amend the rules and guidance to provide that all non-GAAP financial measures (NGFMs) used in the CD&A of proxy statements be subject to the reconciliation and other requirements of Reg G and Item 10(e) of Reg S-K. But how pervasive is the use of NGFMs in executive comp? This article from Audit Analytics puts some additional data behind the brewing controversy about the use of non-GAAP financial measures in executive comp—and the level of increase is substantial.
SEC Chair Jay Clayton has repeatedly made a point of his intent to take the Regulatory Flexibility Act Agenda “seriously,” streamlining it to show what the SEC actually expected to take up in the subsequent period. (Clayton has previously said that the short-term agenda signifies rulemakings that the SEC actually planned to pursue in the following twelve months. See this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) The SEC’s Spring 2019 short-term and long-term agendas have now been posted, reflecting the Chair’s priorities as of March 18, when the agenda was compiled. What stands out is not so much the matters that show up on the short-term agenda—although there are plenty of significant proposals to keep us all busy—but rather the legislatively mandated items that have taken up protracted residency on the long-term (i.e., the maybe never) agenda.
An op-ed co-authored by SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson (who is reportedly planning to leave the SEC this fall, although he’s eligible to stay until the end of 2020) and MIT senior lecturer (and former president of Fidelity) Robert Pozen lambasts the use of non-GAAP targets in determining executive pay, absent more transparent disclosure. The pair argue that, although historically, performance targets were based on GAAP, in recent years, there has been a shift to using non-GAAP pay targets, sometimes involving significant adjustments that can “be used to justify outsize compensation for disappointing results.” What’s the bottom line? Where comp committees base comp on a different scorecard than GAAP, they argue, the committee should have to explain their decision by reconciling to GAAP in the CD&A. Will the SEC take heed?
In October last year, Corp Fin issued a new staff legal bulletin on shareholder proposals, 14J, that examined the exception under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the “ordinary business” exception, addressing, among other topics, the application of the rule to proposals related to executive or director comp. Post-shutdown, Corp Fin has now posted several no-action responses that consider the exception in that context. Do they provide any color or insight?
Much has been written about the problems associated with the prevalence of short-term thinking in corporate America. As noted in a post from The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, an academic study revealed that “three quarters of senior American corporate officials would not make an investment that would benefit a company over the long run if it would derail even one quarterly earnings report.” (See this PubCo post and this article in The Atlantic.) Apparently, that was no joke. As reported in Forbes, for the first six months of 2018, companies in the S&P 500 spent $367 billion on stock buybacks—which can drive increases in quarterly EPS without increasing the underlying long-term economic value of the company—while capex totaled only $317 billion. ls there a way to engineer a course correction?
Proxy advisor Glass Lewis has posted its 2019 Proxy Guidelines and 2019 Guidelines Regarding Shareholder Initiatives. One of the more striking points is that GL indicates that it may, albeit in limited circumstances, recommend against the members of the nominating/governance committee simply for successfully requesting no-action relief from the SEC to exclude (and presumably excluding) a shareholder proposal, where GL views the exclusion to have been detrimental to shareholders. GL’s new guidance includes the following updates:
New SLB 14J on shareholder proposals revisits the economic relevance and ordinary business exclusions
Corp Fin has just released a new staff legal bulletin on shareholder proposals—we’re up to 14J—that once again examines the exclusions under Rules 14a-8(i)(5), the “economic relevance” exception, and 14a-8(i)(7), the “ordinary business” exception. Notably, these rules were also the subject of SLB 14I. More specifically, the new SLB provides guidance with regard to the following:
the nature of the board analysis the staff would find most “helpful” in evaluating a no-action request to exclude a shareholder proposal,
“micromanagement” as a basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) and
the application of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to exclude proposals related to senior executive and/or director compensation matters.
Here’s some news (thanks to compensationstandards.com and Compensia): the structure of the GICS code is changing. “Who cares?” you say. Yep, that’s what I said when I first heard about these changes. (Well, that’s what I said once I figured out that the “Global Industry Classification Standard” (GICS) code is not the same thing as the “Standard Industrial Classification” (SIC) code, a four-digit classification system developed in the 1930s that the SEC uses to classify companies; the SEC requires each company to identify its primary SIC code on the facing page of registration statements. No, SIC codes are not changing.) However, it turns out that the GICS code, a 10-digit classification system developed by MSCI and S&P for use by the global financial community, is employed not only for creating financial indices, but is also critical to the development by proxy advisor ISS of its compensation peer groups and other compensation-related analyses. So, GICS codes matter: for those companies affected, the structural changes could have a significant impact on assessments by ISS of their executive compensation programs. The changes will be effective on September 28, 2018.
You remember, of course, that last month, the president, on his way out of town for the weekend, tossed out to reporters the idea of eliminating quarterly reporting. (See this PubCo post.) The president said that, in his discussions with leaders of the business community regarding ways to improve the business environment, Indra Nooyi, the outgoing CEO of Pepsico, had suggested that one way to help business would be to trim the periodic reporting requirements from quarterly to semiannually. The argument is that the change would not only save time and money, but would also help to deter “short-termism,” as companies would not need to focus on meeting analysts’ expectations on a quarterly basis at the expense of longer term thinking. “We are not thinking far enough out,” he added. (For more on saving time and money through semiannual reporting, see this PubCo post.) But how much impact would a shift to semiannual reporting really have on short-termism?
According to this column in the LA Times, it’s the “single most pernicious idea in modern American finance.” Can you guess? It’s the idea “that the corporation exists to ‘maximize shareholder wealth,’” the columnist proclaims. “As the mantra has evolved since it was declared by conservative economist Milton Friedman in 1970, it has come to mean ‘maximize shareholder wealth to the exclusion of everything else.’ The harvest has been stagnating worker wages, squeezed suppliers, noxious government economic policies, and the steady flow of corporate income to the top 1%. It’s long past time to bury this bad idea in the grave.” Needless to say, many would take issue with the columnist’s view, but probably not Senator Elizabeth Warren, who has recently introduced the “Accountable Capitalism Act,” which would mandate that specified large companies have as a corporate purpose identified in their charters—their new federal charters—the creation of a “general public benefit.”