Category: Litigation

SEC charges Charter Communications with controls violation related to 10b5-1 plans for company buybacks

Yesterday, the SEC announced a settled action against Charter Communications for “violating internal accounting controls requirements when it engaged in stock buybacks not authorized by its board of directors.” More specifically, the Board had authorized the company to conduct stock buybacks using Rule 10b5-1 plans, but the SEC contended that Charter’s plans contained a provision that permitted too much discretion—allowing Charter to “change the total dollar amounts available to buy back stock and to change the timing of buybacks after the plans took effect.”  As a result, the SEC concluded, the plans did not satisfy Rule 10b5-1. But this was not a case about insider trading. Rather, the SEC charged, because the plans did not satisfy Rule 10b5-1, the buybacks were effectively unauthorized. And that was a problem of ineffective internal accounting controls (which, the SEC maintained, aren’t necessarily just about accounting). According to Melissa Hodgman, Associate Director of Enforcement, “[c]ompanies whose boards authorize buybacks using Rule 10b5-1 plans must have controls that reasonably assure that their trading plans meet all of the rule’s conditions….This includes the fundamental requirement that, to benefit from the protection of Rule 10b5-1, traders have to relinquish their ability to influence the amount or timing of trades after their trading plans go into effect.” Charter agreed to pay a civil penalty of $25 million. Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissented.  

Some highlights of the 2023 PLI Securities Regulation Institute

This year’s PLI Securities Regulation Institute was a source for a lot of useful information and interesting perspectives. Panelists discussed a variety of topics, including climate disclosure (although no one shared any insights into the timing of the SEC’s final rules), proxy season issues, accounting issues, ESG and anti-ESG, and some of the most recent SEC rulemakings, such as pay versus performance, cybersecurity, buybacks and 10b5-1 plans. Some of the panels focused on these recent rulemakings echoed concerns expressed last year about the difficulty and complexity of implementation of these new rules, only this time, we also heard a few panelists questioning the rationale and effectiveness of these new mandates. What was the purpose of all this complication? Was it addressing real problems or just theoretical ones? Are investors really taking the disclosure into account? Is it all for naught?  Pay versus performance, for example, was described as “a lot of work,” but, according to one of the program co-chairs, in terms of its impact, a “nothingburger.”  (Was “nothingburger” the word of the week?) Aside from the agita over the need to implement the volume of complex rules, a key theme seemed to be the importance of controls and process—the need to have them, follow them and document that you followed them—as well as an intensified focus on cross-functional teams and avoiding silos. In addition, geopolitical uncertainty seems to be affecting just about everything. (For Commissioner Mark Uyeda’s perspective on the rulemaking process presented in his remarks before the Institute, see this PubCo post.) Below are just some of the takeaways, in no particular order.

Will the SEC’s shadow trading theory fall to SCOTUS’s major questions doctrine?

In August 2021, the SEC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court charging Matthew Panuwat, a former employee of Medivation Inc., an oncology-focused biopharma, with insider trading in advance of Medivation’s announcement that it would be acquired by a big pharma company.  But it wasn’t your average run-of-the-mill insider trading case. Panuwat didn’t trade in shares of Medivation or shares of the acquiror, nor did he tip anyone about the transaction.  No, according to the SEC, he engaged in what has been referred to as “shadow trading”; he used the information about his employer’s acquisition to purchase call options on another biopharma, which the SEC claimed was comparable to Medivation.  (See this PubCo post.)  Since then, we’ve seen the usual moves on the chess board (discussed briefly below). But what’s particularly interesting, as Alison Frankel pointed out in Reuters, is the amicus brief filed by the Investor Choice Advocates Network, a self-described “nonprofit, public interest organization focused on expanding access to markets by underrepresented investors and entrepreneurs.”  In its brief, ICAN contended that the SEC’s invocation of the novel “shadow-trading” theory made this a “major questions” case—a judicial torpedo that we might begin to see fired with some regularity.  

Fifth Circuit grants Chamber’s petition for review of buyback rule—will the Court ultimately vacate the rule?

In May this year, the SEC adopted final rules intended to modernize and improve disclosure regarding company stock repurchases. The rule requires quarterly reporting of detailed quantitative information on daily repurchase activity and revises and expands the narrative requirements, including disclosure regarding the rationale for the buyback. (See this PubCo post.) It didn’t take long for the Chamber to object.  Just over a week following adoption, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, along with two Texas co-plaintiffs, submitted a petition to the Fifth Circuit for review of the final rule. Petitioners made three arguments: that “(1) the rationale-disclosure requirement violates the First Amendment by impermissibly compelling their speech; (2) the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the final rule by not considering their comments or conducting a proper cost benefit analysis; and (3) the SEC did not provide the public with a meaningful opportunity to comment.”   On Halloween, the three-judge panel issued its opinion. The Court granted the petition, holding that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act. But the Court did not vacate the rule—not yet anyway. Instead, the Court remanded the rule back to the SEC for 30 days to attempt to repair the analytical defects. Will the SEC adequately repair the defects? Will the Court ultimately vacate the rule? That all remains to be seen.

SEC charges SolarWinds and CISO with securities fraud and control failures

You remember the 2020 SolarWinds hack, perhaps one of the worst cyberattacks in history?  As NPR described it in 2021, we all regularly receive routine software updates like this one:

“‘This release includes bug fixes, increased stability and performance improvements’…. Last spring, a Texas-based company called SolarWinds made one such software update available to its customers. It was supposed to provide the regular fare—bug fixes, performance enhancements—to the company’s popular network management system, a software program called Orion that keeps a watchful eye on all the various components in a company’s network. Customers simply had to log into the company’s software development website, type a password and then wait for the update to land seamlessly onto their servers. The routine update, it turns out, is no longer so routine. Hackers believed to be directed by the Russian intelligence service, the SVR, used that routine software update to slip malicious code into Orion’s software and then used it as a vehicle for a massive cyberattack against America. ‘Eighteen thousand [customers] was our best estimate of who may have downloaded the code between March and June of 2020,’”

according to the Company’s CEO. And not just any customers—the Company determined that many very well-known companies and about a dozen government agencies were compromised, including the Treasury, Justice and Energy departments, the Pentagon and, ironically, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, part of the Department of Homeland Security. On Monday, the SEC announced that it had filed a complaint against SolarWinds and its Chief Information Security Officer, Timothy G. Brown, charging ‘fraud and  internal control failures relating to allegedly known cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities.”  In the complaint, the SEC charges that “SolarWinds’ public statements about its cybersecurity practices and risks painted a starkly different picture from internal discussions and assessments about the Company’s cybersecurity policy violations, vulnerabilities, and cyberattacks.” According to Gurbir S. Grewal, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, the SEC’s enforcement action “underscores our message to issuers: implement strong controls calibrated to your risk environments and level with investors about known concerns.”

It’s not over till it’s over: Petition filed for rehearing en banc on Nasdaq board diversity rule

As discussed in this PubCo post, on October 18, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the petitions filed by the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment and the National Center for Public Policy Research challenging the SEC’s final order approving the Nasdaq listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure. The new listing rules adopted a “comply or explain” mandate for board diversity for most listed companies and required companies listed on Nasdaq’s U.S. exchange to publicly disclose “consistent, transparent diversity statistics” regarding the composition of their boards.  (See this PubCo post.)  Given that, by repute, the Fifth Circuit is the circuit of choice for advocates of conservative causes, the decision to deny the petition may have taken some by surprise—unless, that is, they were aware, as discussed in the WSJ and Reuters, that the three judges on this panel happened to all be appointed by Democrats.  Yesterday, the Petitioners filed a petition requesting a rehearing en banc by the Fifth Circuit, where Republican presidents have appointed 12 of the 16 active judges.  Not that politics has anything to do with it, of course.

Relentless Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce: SCOTUS grants cert. to another case about Atlantic herring—and Chevron deference

On October 13, SCOTUS granted cert. in the case of Relentless, Inc. v. Dept of Commerce, a case about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service has the authority to require herring fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance.  Does that ring a bell?  Probably, because it’s exactly the same issue on which SCOTUS has already granted cert. in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. (See this PubCo post.) Why grant cert. in this case too?  It’s been widely reported that the reason was to allow Justice Kenji Brown Jackson, who had recused herself on Loper Bright, to participate in what will likely be a very important decision: whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies (such as the National Marine Fisheries Service or, as has happened fairly often, the SEC, see this Cooley News Brief). The question presented is “ [w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.” The decision could narrow, or even completely undo, that deference. The grant of cert provided that the two cases will be argued in tandem in the January 2024 argument session. Mark your calendars.

Fifth Circuit denies petition challenging Nasdaq’s board diversity rule

On Friday, August 6, 2021, the SEC approved a Nasdaq proposal for new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure, accompanied by a proposal to provide free access to a board recruiting service. The new listing rules adopted a “comply or explain” mandate for board diversity for most listed companies and required companies listed on Nasdaq’s U.S. exchange to publicly disclose “consistent, transparent diversity statistics” regarding the composition of their boards.  (See this PubCo post.) As anticipated, a court challenge to these rules didn’t take long to materialize. On Monday, August 9, the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment filed a slim petition under Section 25(a) of the Exchange Act in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—the Alliance has its principal place of business in Texas—for review of the SEC’s final order approving the Nasdaq rule.  (See this PubCo post.) That petition was soon followed by a new petition challenging the rules filed by the National Center for Public Policy Research and subsequently transferred to the Fifth Circuit where the earlier filed petition was pending. (See this PubCo post.) Yesterday, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit—by repute, the Circuit of choice for advocates of conservative causes—denied those petitions, in effect upholding Nasdaq’s board diversity listing rules. According to the unanimous decision,  “AFBR and NCPPR have given us no reason to conclude that the SEC’s Approval Order violates the Exchange Act or the APA.” The case is Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment, National Center for Public Policy Research v. SEC.  

ICYMI: column from Matt Levine on SEC Enforcement’s “silly season”

After all the PubCo posts on the avalanche of SEC enforcement cases muscled into the last couple of days before the SEC’s fiscal year end, I thought this column in Bloomberg from Matt Levine might be of particular interest.  The relevant portion of the column, called the “SEC silly season,” discusses the apparent scramble by the SEC at the end of its fiscal year to bring as many enforcement actions as possible in response to “performance-reporting pressures,” that is, the pressures to make its stats to achieve optimal Congressional funding.  According to academic research cited in the column, that scramble is not just “apparent,” it’s real, and it has practical implications for enforcement behavior.  The research showed that the average number of cases filed in September “is almost double the average in other months,” and that the “spike is larger when case totals are behind pace to meet last year’s case total, which likely serves as a de facto performance benchmark.” The SEC achieves this fiscal-year-end increase, according to the research, “by changing its enforcement behavior related to substantive cases,” that is, through prioritization of less complex cases and imposition of more lenient penalties, including financial discounts, relative to other periods.  For example, the September cases are “significantly more likely to reference defendant cooperation and to only name companies as defendants, and are less likely to include a fraud allegation and to reference parallel criminal proceedings.” Accordingly, the authors found that the  “evidence is consistent with the SEC agreeing to more lenient settlement terms to increase case volume at fiscal year-end—an unintended consequence of performance reporting that undermines the SEC’s core values.” As the authors of the research suggest, might defendants familiar with this “regulatory inconsistency” be able to use it to their advantage?

Is political corruption securities fraud?

You remember Matt Levine’s mantra in his “Money Stuff” column on Bloomberg: “everything is securities fraud”? “You know the basic idea,” he says, a

“company does something bad, or something bad happens to it. Its stock price goes down, because of the bad thing. Shareholders sue: Doing the bad thing and not immediately telling shareholders about it, the shareholders say, is securities fraud. Even if the company does immediately tell shareholders about the bad thing, which is not particularly common, the shareholders might sue, claiming that the company failed to disclose the conditions and vulnerabilities that allowed the bad thing to happen. And so contributing to global warming is securities fraud, and sexual harassment by executives is securities fraud, and customer data breaches are securities fraud, and mistreating killer whales is securities fraud, and whatever else you’ve got. Securities fraud is a universal regulatory regime; anything bad that is done by or happens to a public company is also securities fraud, and it is often easier to punish the bad thing as securities fraud than it is to regulate it directly.” (Money Stuff, 6/26/19)  

(See this PubCo post.) But here’s a new one—bribery and political corruption as securities fraud. As described in this press release, in the fiscal-year-end enforcement crush, the SEC brought settled charges against Exelon Corporation, a utility services holding company, and its subsidiary, electric utility company Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), and filed a complaint against ComEd’s former CEO alleging “fraud in connection with a multi-year scheme to corruptly influence and reward the then-Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives.” Exelon and ComEd agreed to settle the charges, with Exelon paying a civil penalty of $46.2 million.  The charges against the CEO are headed for trial.  So how is this securities fraud? According to the Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Public Finance Abuse Unit, the CEO’s “remarks to investors about ComEd’s lobbying efforts hid the reality of the long-running political corruption scheme in which they were engaged….When corporate executives speak to investors, they must not mislead by omission.”