Mandatory shareholder arbitration provisions for IPOs? SEC Chair says “not on my list”
Depending on your point of view, you may have experienced either heart palpitations or increased serotonin levels when you heard, back in July 2017, that SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar had, in a speech before the Heritage Foundation, advised that the SEC was open to the idea of allowing companies contemplating IPOs to include mandatory shareholder arbitration provisions in corporate charters. As reported, Piwowar “encouraged” companies undertaking IPOs to “come to us to ask for relief to put in mandatory arbitration into their charters.” (See this PubCo post.) As discussed in this PubCo post, at the same time, in Senate testimony, SEC Chair Jay Clayton, asked by Senator Sherrod Brown about Piwowar’s comments, responded that, while he recognized the importance of the ability of shareholders to go to court, he would not “prejudge” the issue. According to some commentators at the time, to the extent that these views appeared to indicate a significant shift in SEC policy on mandatory arbitration, they could portend “the beginning of the end of securities fraud class actions.” Then, in January of this year, the rumors about mandatory arbitration resurfaced in a Bloomberg article, which cited “three people familiar with the matter” for the proposition that the SEC is “laying the groundwork” for this “possible policy shift.” But in recent Senate testimony, Clayton reportedly put the kibosh on these signals.
In light of the recent fraud charges against audit firm partners and the PCAOB, what questions should audit committees ask their outside auditors?
Recent civil and criminal fraud charges against partners at KPMG and staffers at the PCAOB, arising out of “their participation in a scheme to misappropriate and use confidential information relating to the PCAOB’s planned inspections of KPMG,” have led some managements and audit committee members to consider whether there is more they should be doing to ensure that their outside audit firms are not plagued by similar concerns. This article from Compliance Week sifts through a speech by Helen Munter, PCAOB director of inspections and registration, to assemble a series of questions that, in light of these recent charges, may be appropriate for audit committee members to pose to their outside audit firms.
BlackRock advocates that at least two women be on each company board
The lede from the WSJ is that “for the first time,” BlackRock (reportedly the largest asset management firm with $6.3 trillion under management) is “stating publicly that companies in which it invests should have at least two female directors.” According to the WSJ, the new disclosure, just one component of BlackRock’s recently posted Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities (more on the guidelines to come in a later post), “represents a small but significant shift for one of the largest shareholders of American companies.” Board diversity has been a consistent issue for several large institutional investors in recent years but without much specificity, and reportedly, BlackRock has, in the past, quietly encouraged companies to have a minimum of two women on their boards. Now, BlackRock is trumpeting that standard publicly.
Will Corp Fin revisit (again) Rule 14a-8(i)(9), the exclusion for conflicting proposals?
The Council of Institutional Investors has sent a letter to William Hinman, director of Corp Fin, raising objections to the staff’s treatment of a recent shareholder proposal. The staff permitted the company, the AES Corporation, to exclude a shareholder proposal submitted by John Chevedden that sought to reduce the threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting from 25% to 10%. The basis for exclusion was Rule 14a-8(i)(9), which allows a shareholder proposal to be excluded if it directly conflicts with a management proposal to be submitted for a vote at the same shareholders meeting. In its letter, CII charged the company with “gaming the system to exclude a vote on a legitimate proposal that receives substantial shareholder support when it is voted on at other companies – to reduce the threshold for calling a special meeting,” and urged the SEC to revisit, once again, its approach to Rule 14a-8(i)(9).
Want a preview of pay-ratio disclosure? Equilar releases pay-ratio survey data
Equilar has just released the results of an anonymous survey of public companies, with 356 respondents, which asked these companies to indicate the CEO-employee pay ratios they anticipated reporting in their 2018 proxy statements. As you would expect, there was a lot of variation among companies based on industry, market cap, revenue, workforce size and geography. In addition, because the rule provided significant flexibility in how companies could identify the median employee and in how they calculate his or her total annual compensation, variations in company methodology likely had a significant impact on the results. These variations in the data underscore the soundness of the SEC’s view, expressed at the time it adopted the pay-ratio rule, that the rule was “designed to allow shareholders to better understand and assess a particular [company’s] compensation practices and pay ratio disclosures rather than to facilitate a comparison of this information from one [company] to another”; “the primary benefit” of the pay-ratio disclosure, according to the SEC, was to provide shareholders with a “company-specific metric” that can be used to evaluate CEO compensation within the context of that company.
First pay-ratio disclosure sighted
Thanks to my colleagues Amy Wood, Dani Nazemian and the intrepid Mariane Konstantaras, all three of our Comp & Ben Group, we now have a sighting of pay-ratio disclosure under the new pay-ratio rules, Reg S-K Item 402(u). Apparently, the first example was not in a proxy statement but in a Form S-1 registration statement filed with the SEC yesterday.
Shareholder proposal to exclude impact of share buybacks on executive compensation
In 2016, the AFL-CIO submitted several shareholder proposals designed to curb the impact of stock buybacks on executive compensation. (See this PubCo post.) The question at the time was whether we would see many more of these proposals. However, amid significant media and academic criticism, as well as relatively high stock valuations, the levels of stock buybacks declined, and the anticipated wave of proposals on buybacks did not materialize. However, the new tax act is expected to trigger a new spike in the levels of stock buybacks. (See this MarketWatch article.) Perhaps with that in mind, one of the most prolific proponents of shareholder proposals has submitted a proposal to eliminate the impact of stock buybacks in determining executive compensation. Will these proposals now become a thing?
SEC-NYU Dialogue on Securities Markets focuses on shareholder engagement
While the topic of last week’s fourth SEC-NYU Dialogue on Securities Markets was shareholder engagement—focusing on the roles of institutional and activist investors— the real hot topic was the recent letter to CEOs from BlackRock’s Laurence Fink, which was at least mentioned on every panel. (See this PubCo post.)
SEC Chair discusses completion of Dodd-Frank rulemaking mandate
In a speech delivered by video to the Securities Regulation Institute in San Diego, SEC Chair Jay Clayton shed some light (but just a little) on the anticipated completion of the rulemaking mandates under Dodd-Frank.
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