Gensler talks about AI (and a bit about climate)

Yesterday, in remarks at Yale Law School, SEC Chair Gary Gensler talked about the opportunities and challenges of AI.  According to Gensler, while AI “opens up tremendous opportunities for humanity,” it “also raises a host of issues that aren’t new but are accentuated by it. First, AI models’ decisions and outcomes are often unexplainable. Second, AI also may make biased decisions because the outcomes of its algorithms may be based on data reflecting historical biases. Third, the ability of these predictive models to predict doesn’t mean they are always accurate. If you’ve used it to draft a paper or find citations, beware, because it can hallucinate.” In his remarks, Gensler also addressed the potential for systemic risk and fraud. But, in the end, he struck a more positive note, concluding that the role of the SEC involves both “allowing for issuers and investors to benefit from the great potential of AI while also ensuring that we guard against the inherent risks.”

Does shareholder primacy mean just maximizing profits—and what does Exxon have to do with it?

As you know, the shareholder primacy theory is widely attributed to the Chicago school of economists, beginning in the 1970s, with economist Milton Friedman famously arguing that the only “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”  Subsequently, two other economists published a paper characterizing shareholders as “‘principals’ who hired executives and board members as ‘agents.’ In other words, when you are an executive or corporate director, you work for the shareholders.” The idea, in effect, is that, as owners, shareholders may legitimately require that the company conduct its business in accordance with their desires. Of course, this idea has been subject to criticism by many as improperly ignoring the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, customers and the community—so-called “stakeholder capitalism.”  Under Friedman’s version of shareholder primacy, the desire of shareholders has long been presumed to be to maximize value and increase profits. But is it? The author of this article in Fortune makes the argument that the ongoing Exxon litigation against Arjuna and Follow This, two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal, throws into sharp relief a schism that has formed among adherents to the idea of shareholder primacy. The question posed is “what do shareholders really want, and are companies ever allowed to ignore them? Arjuna and Follow This own Exxon stock and are trying to dictate how the energy giant behaves. However, they are demanding more than dividends: They want Exxon to commit to more ambitious emissions reductions, and to some, that’s just as bad as companies admitting an obligation to workers or the community.” Does shareholder primacy necessarily mean just maximizing profits?

It’s back to the future—or is it forward to the past?—on share repurchase disclosure

On December 19, a Fifth Circuit panel pulled the plug on the SEC’s Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization rule, issuing an opinion vacating the rule.   On Friday last week, Corp Fin announced that, yes, the rule had been vacated and, in case you were wondering, “the disclosure requirements revert to those in effect prior to the Final Rule’s effective date.”  It remains to be seen whether the SEC will repropose new rules on this topic or has its hands full with other stuff—like climate disclosure—and so will just let this one lie.

SEC Chief Accountant urges focus on professional skepticism and audit quality

SEC Chief Accountant Paul Munter has posted a new Statement.  What’s on his mind?  Apparently, he is disturbed that, in recent inspections of audits, the PCAOB has reported a “troubling” increase in deficiency rates—meaning the PCAOB found that there was insufficient audit evidence obtained to support the auditor’s opinion.  Deficiency rates went from 29% in the PCAOB’s 2020 inspections to 34% in its 2021 inspections, up now to 40% in its 2022 audit inspections. This, he warned, was a “troubling trendline in PCAOB inspections results”—emphasis again on “troubling.” What does he prescribe?  A “commitment to high-quality audits,” which,  “in turn, calls for the auditor to exercise objective, impartial judgment and rigorous professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating evidence throughout the audit to support the audit opinions provided.”  To be sure, both auditors and audit committees “should pay particularly close attention to areas that have been frequently identified as causes of deficiencies in PCAOB inspections.” In addition, he advises that “auditors should conduct engagements with a mindset that the investors, rather than management, are the audit client.”  This commitment to high-quality audits, he contends, is the only way for auditors to protect the investing public. He offers advice for both auditors and audit committees.

Temperature drops on Exxon litigation over shareholder climate proposal—or does it?

You remember that, in January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement? On February 1, Exxon filed a notice of withdrawal of its request for an expedited briefing schedule for its summary judgment motion in the case. Why? Because the two proponents had notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal.  End of story? Not necessarily.  Exxon told Reuters that it would not withdraw the complaint, maintaining that there were still critical issues for the Court.  And in a Court filing yesterday, Exxon explained why it believed that there was still a live controversy for the Court to resolve. How the Court responds remains to be seen. But regardless of what the Court decides, the withdrawal of the proposal in response to the litigation may well encourage other companies, similarly faced with unwelcome proposals, to bypass the SEC’s standard shareholder proposal process and follow the go straight-to-court strategy.

What happened with proxy votes in 2023?

Starting off the new year, consultant Semler Brossy’s latest report analyzes proxy results for 2023 among the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000, including votes on say on pay, environmental and social shareholder proposals, director elections and equity plans. According to SB, last year saw improvements in say-on-pay vote results and a decline in approval rates for E&S shareholder proposals. There was little change in the rate of favorable votes for director nominees, while there was an increase in vote failures for equity plan proposals. And SB shows that unfavorable vote recommendations from ISS apparently do make a difference.

The Chamber sues California over climate legislation

You remember California’s climate legislation signed into law just last year—Senate Bill 253, the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act, and Senate Bill 261, Greenhouse gases: climate-related financial risk? (See this PubCo post.) The U.S. and California Chambers of Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation and others have just filed a new complaint against the California Air Resources Board challenging these two California laws. The lawsuit seeks declaratory relief that the two laws are void because they violate the First Amendment, are precluded by federal law, and are invalid under the Constitution’s limitations on extraterritorial regulation, particularly under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The litigation also seeks injunctive relief to prevent CARB from taking any action to enforce these two laws.  These California laws have the potential to affect thousands of companies, including companies domiciled in other states, and many will be alert to see if these laws survive this legal action unscathed. To some extent, the litigation will also function as a dress rehearsal for the litigation that’s likely to surface when the SEC finally adopts its long-awaited climate disclosure rules. What does this litigation augur for the SEC’s anticipated climate disclosure rules?  While the dormant Commerce Clause is unlikely to play much of a role in a future challenge to the SEC’s expected climate disclosure regulations, the First Amendment claim is certainly one that we have seen used successfully in the past and are likely to see again. For example, it was raised in connection with challenges to Rule 14a-8 and to the stock repurchase rules, as well as at a recent House Financial Services subcommittee hearing on oversight of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure, where the contention that the proposal’s compelled speech would violate the First Amendment was a topic of discussion. (See this PubCo post.) Now, we’ll see how well it plays in federal court in California.

What’s happening with critical audit matters?

Ideagen AuditAnalytics has just released its 2024 Report on Critical Audit Matters, a 3-Year Review, covering the years 2020 to 2022.  Under the auditing standard for the auditor’s report (AS 3101), adopted in 2017, CAMs are defined as “matters communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee and that: (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements; and (2) involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.” Essentially, the concept is intended to capture the matters that kept the auditor up at night, so long as they meet the standard’s criteria. AS 3101 was initially adopted in 2017 and phased in beginning in 2019 according to the status of the filer. (See this PubCo post.) The Report provides data on the prevalence of CAMs and the most common topics for CAMs, and takes a deeper dive on matters such as valuation of assets in the merger context and going concerns.

Was it SPAC week? SEC charges SPAC with misleading statements

Perfectly calibrated to slap an exclamation point on last Wednesday’s 581-page SPAC release (see this PubCo post), this new SEC Order, posted the following day, reflects settled charges against Northern Star Investment Corp. II, a SPAC, for misleading statements in its SEC filings in connection with its SPAC IPO and failed de-SPAC transaction. In the SPAC release, the SEC noted concerns from commentators regarding the adequacy of the disclosures provided to investors in SPAC IPOs and de-SPAC transactions.  In this case, the SEC charged that Northern Star stated in its SEC filings that, prior to filing its S-1 for its IPO, it had had no substantive discussions with any potential target; in reality, however, Northern Star had had several discussions with the ultimate target regarding a potential SPAC business combination. According to the Director of the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office, “Northern Star’s failure to disclose discussions with its merger target kept investors in the dark about its future plans, information that would have been important in deciding whether to invest in this SPAC….Given that the purpose of a SPAC is to identify and acquire an operating business, SPACs should be transparent about any pre-IPO discussions with potential acquisition targets.”  Northern Star was ordered to pay a civil money penalty of $1.5 million for violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act.

Exxon employs “direct-to-court” strategy for shareholder proposal. Will others do the same?

Back in 2014, a few companies, facing shareholder proposals from the prolific shareholder-proposal activist, John Chevedden, and his associates, adopted a “direct-to-court” strategy, bypassing the standard SEC no-action process for exclusion of shareholder proposals.  In each of these cases, the court handed a victory of sorts to Mr. Chevedden, refusing to issue declaratory judgments that the companies could exclude his proposals. (At the end of the day, one proposal was defeated, one succeeded and one was ultimately permitted to be excluded by the SEC. See this PubCo post, and these News Briefs of 3/18/14, 3/13/14 and 3/3/14.) Now, ten years later, ExxonMobil has picked up the baton, having just filed a complaint against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. In summary, the proposal asks Exxon to accelerate the reduction of GHG emissions in the medium term and to disclose new plans, targets and timetables for these reductions.  Will Exxon meet the same fate as the companies in 2014? Perhaps more significantly, Exxon took this action in part because it viewed the SEC’s shareholder proposal process as a “flawed” system “that does not serve investors’ interests and has become ripe for abuse by activists with minimal shares and no interest in growing long-term shareholder value.” If Exxon is successful in its litigation, will more companies, likewise faced with environmental or social proposals and perhaps perceiving themselves beset by the same flawed process, follow suit (so to speak) and sidestep the SEC?