Tag: Delaware Chancery Court

Disney decision to speak out on issue of social significance within board’s business judgment

Boards and their advisors seeking to navigate the culture wars and their often conflicting pressures from a variety of stakeholders and outside groups may find some comfort and guidance in this recent decision from the Delaware Chancery Court in Simeone v. The Walt Disney Company.  The case involved a books-and-records demand from a stockholder asserting a potential breach of fiduciary duty by Disney’s directors and officers in their determination to publicly oppose Florida’s so-called “Don’t Say Gay” bill. Originally, Disney was silent on the bill. However, following reproaches from employees and other creative partners, Disney’s board deliberated at a special meeting, and the company changed course and publicly criticized the bill.  The Court declined to grant the plaintiff’s books-and-records request, concluding that the plaintiff had not provided a credible basis from which to infer wrongdoing and thus had not “demonstrated a proper purpose to inspect books and records.” Rather, the Court concluded, the Disney board had made a business decision to reverse course—“a decision that cannot provide a credible basis to suspect potential mismanagement irrespective of its outcome.”  Under Delaware’s business judgment rule, directors have “significant discretion to guide corporate strategy—including on social and political issues.”  Importantly, the Court confirmed that, in exercising its business judgment, a board may take into account the interests of non-stockholder corporate stakeholders where those interests are “rationally related” to building long-term value.

McDonald’s court dismisses Caremark claims against directors

Here we have another in a string of McDonald’s cases—all of them arising out of workplace misconduct at McDonald’s, none even dipping its toe into employment law.  First, you’ll remember, there were settled charges brought by the SEC against McDonald’s and its former CEO, Stephen Easterbrook, arising out of disclosure about the termination of Easterbrook on account of workplace misconduct.  Then there was the derivative Caremark litigation for breach of fiduciary duty against David Fairhurst, who formerly served as Executive Vice President and Global Chief People Officer of McDonald’s, for consciously ignoring red flags about workplace misconduct and engaging in some pretty extensive workplace misconduct himself.  Now, we have a new decision out of Delaware regarding the derivative Caremark litigation against the company’s directors alleging that they ignored red flags about the company’s culture that condoned workplace misconduct.  But this case turned out to be different—VC Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the complaint against the directors.  The Court held that, in this case, the directors did not ignore the numerous red flags: the facts cited in the pleadings did “not support a reasonably conceivable claim against them for breach of the duty of oversight.”  Once again, the case reinforces that high bar described by former Chief Justice Leo Strine for Caremark claims:  “Caremark claims are difficult to plead and ultimately to prove out,” and constitute “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” (See this PubCo post.)

Delaware VC Laster finds a “black swan”—a fiduciary duty of oversight for officers

In In re McDonald’s Corporation, defendant David Fairhurst, who formerly served as Executive Vice President and Global Chief People Officer of McDonald’s Corporation, contested a stockholders’ claim that he had breached his fiduciary duty of oversight by arguing that there is no fiduciary duty of oversight for officers, only for directors. VC Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court responded this way: “That observation is descriptively accurate, but it does not follow that officers do not owe oversight duties. For centuries dating back to the Roman satirist Juvenal, Europeans used the phrase ‘black swan’ as a figure of speech for something that did not exist. Then in the late eighteen century, Europeans arrived on the shores of Australia, where they found black swans. The fact that no one had seen one before did not mean that they could not or did not exist…. Framed in terms of the issue in this case, decisions recognizing director oversight duties confirm that directors owe those duties; those decisions do not rule out the possibility that officers also owe oversight duties.” With that—and a lengthy exposition—Laster confirmed that Fairhurst did indeed have a duty of oversight, much like the Caremark duties applicable to corporate directors.

Delaware Chancery invalidates exclusive federal forum provisions

In March 2018, in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, SCOTUS held that state courts continue to have concurrent jurisdiction over class actions alleging only ’33 Act violations by private plaintiffs and that defendants cannot remove actions filed in state court to federal court.  (See this PubCo post.) Both before and especially after Cyan, to avoid state court litigation of ’33 Act claims (and forum shopping by plaintiffs for the most favorable state court forum), many companies adopted “exclusive forum” provisions in their charters or bylaws that designated the federal courts as the exclusive forum for litigation under the ’33 Act. Delaware law expressly permits the adoption of charter or bylaw provisions that designate Delaware as the exclusive forum for adjudicating “internal corporate claims,” i.e., claims, including derivative claims, that are based on a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder or as to which the corporation law confers jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery.   However, federal securities class actions are not expressly included. (See this PubCo post.)

The enforceability of “exclusive federal forum” provisions was then challenged in the Delaware courts in a case seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate the provisions included in the Delaware Certificates of Incorporation of three companies. And, after Cyan, that Delaware case took on much greater significance. A decision in that case, Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, has now been rendered by the Delaware Chancery Court. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Vice Chancellor Laster held that all three of the exclusive federal forum provisions at issue  in that case were invalid.

Delaware Chancery Court applies entire fairness standard of review to director compensation

by Cydney Posner What is the judicial standard of review applicable to an award of compensation by directors to directors under an equity incentive compensation plan that has been approved by the shareholders?  That was the question before the Delaware Chancery Court in Calma v. Templeton. The answer is, as always: […]

Delaware Chancery Court addresses application of fee-shifting bylaw to former stockholder

by Cydney Posner In a case just decided, Strougo v. Hollander, C.A. No. 9770-CB (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2015), the Delaware Chancery Court addressed the issue of whether the timing of adoption affects the enforceability of a unilaterally adopted fee-shifting bylaw against former stockholders.  While it appears that, in light […]

Fee-shifting bylaw developments in the courts

by Cydney Posner Those expecting that the Delaware court, in a case involving Hemispherx, would soon address the as-applied validity of a fee-shifting bylaw may be disappointed. (As discussed in this post and this Cooley Alert, the Delaware Supreme has already ruled in another case that a “fee-shifting” bylaw adopted […]