Tag: ESG shareholder proposals
What were the major trends of the 2024 proxy season on ESG shareholder proposals?
This article from Morningstar published on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance examines three major trends of the 2024 proxy season regarding environmental, social and governance shareholder proposals. The author, the Director of Investment Stewardship Research at Morningstar, reports that, while the number of ESG-related proposals increased, there was a “twist in the tale”: the increase primarily reflected a jump in anti-ESG proposals. Although support for ESG proposals on the whole was relatively flat at 23%, Morningstar found a “rebound in support for governance-focused proposals,” offsetting a decline in support for E&S proposals.
Court calls a halt to Exxon case against Arjuna
In January, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Arjuna Capital, LLC and Follow This, the two proponents of a climate-related shareholder proposal submitted to Exxon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it may exclude their proposal from its 2024 annual meeting proxy statement. Then, the two proponents notified Exxon that they had withdrawn their proposal and promised not to refile; therefore, they said, the case was moot. But Exxon refused to withdraw its complaint because it believed that there was still a critical live controversy for the Court to resolve. And the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed—at least as to Arjuna. While the Court dismissed the case against Follow This, an association organized in the Netherlands, for lack of personal jurisdiction, it allowed the case against Arjuna to proceed on the basis of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, citing precedent that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” (For background on this case, see this PubCo post.) According to the Court, the “voluntary-cessation doctrine requires more than platitudes to render a case moot;…to moot Exxon’s claim, Defendants must show that it is ‘absolutely clear’ the relevant conduct ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” But the argument continued, even after the decision was rendered, as Arjuna continued to submit letters to Exxon in which Arjuna “unconditionally and irrevocably covenant[ed] to refrain henceforth from submitting any proposal for consideration by Exxon shareholders relating to GHG or climate change,” and Exxon continued to contend that the letters were not enough. (See this PubCo post.) Finally, yesterday, after a hearing on the matter, the Court called a halt, issuing an Order that Exxon’s claim was moot and dismissing the action without prejudice. But not before the Court got in a few digs at Arjuna, activism and even at the SEC.
What happened with no-action requests this proxy season?
According to “SEC No Action Statistics to May 1, 2024” from the Shareholder Rights Group, this proxy season, the SEC staff “has nearly doubled the number of exclusions” of shareholder proposals compared with 2023; that is, relative to the prior year, the staff has issued almost twice the number of letters indicating that it would not recommend enforcement action if the company excluded the proposal from its proxy statement. While that surge reflects primarily a “sharp increase” in the number of requests for no-action filed by companies, importantly, the article indicates that it also reflects an increase in the relative proportion of no-action requests granted. From November 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024, the article reports, the SEC has granted company requests for no-action regarding shareholder proposals about 68% of the time (excluding requests withdrawn), compared with 56% at the same point last year. Notably, the article reports, that percentage (68%) is fairly comparable to the average exclusion rate (69%) during the prior administration (2017 to 2020). Since the issuance of SLB 14L in 2021, the staff has come in for criticism for applying a revised approach to evaluating no-action requests that some market participants considered perhaps a bit too generous to proponents of proposals, leading to an excess of overly prescriptive proposals presented at shareholder meetings. As the article suggests, has this criticism led to a moderation of that approach?
Is ESG a “must have” only in boom-times?
Not so long ago, zeal for corporate action on ESG was skyrocketing. Now? Not so much. What happened? Many have attributed the decline in appetite for ESG to the politicization of ESG and particularly to ESG backlash. This paper from the Rock Center for Corporate governance at Stanford has another idea. Has “ESG enthusiasm” reached its expiration date or, as the paper posits, is it like an alligator Birkin bag, just a luxury—something to pursue only when you’re “feeling flush”? In economics, the authors explain, demand for most items declines as prices increase. Not so with luxury goods, where “a high price tag stimulates demand in part because of the social benefits the purchaser receives by signaling to others their ability to afford it.” Demand for luxury goods often rises and falls with the economy; when times are prosperous, demand for luxury goods increases and when money is tight, demand falls. In that light, a “case can be made,” the authors contend, “that ESG is a luxury good.”
What happened with proxy votes in 2023?
Starting off the new year, consultant Semler Brossy’s latest report analyzes proxy results for 2023 among the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000, including votes on say on pay, environmental and social shareholder proposals, director elections and equity plans. According to SB, last year saw improvements in say-on-pay vote results and a decline in approval rates for E&S shareholder proposals. There was little change in the rate of favorable votes for director nominees, while there was an increase in vote failures for equity plan proposals. And SB shows that unfavorable vote recommendations from ISS apparently do make a difference.
Hey, it’s “ESG month”—House ESG Working Group takes on shareholder proposal process
“ESG month” may not be exactly what you think. It’s the moniker, according to Politico, ascribed to the plan of the House Financial Services Committee, reflected in this interim report from its ESG Working Group, “to spend the next few weeks holding hearings and voting on bills designed to send a clear signal: Corporations, in particular big investment managers, should think twice about integrating climate and social goals into their business plans.” But this is not just another generic offensive in the culture wars; according to Politico, this effort is more targeted—aimed not at major brands of beer or amusement parks, but rather at the processes that some argue activists use to pressure companies to address ESG concerns, as well as the “firms that play big roles in ESG investing.” At the first of six hearings on July 12, Committee Chair Patrick McHenry maintained that the series of hearings and related proposed legislation was not about “delivering a message,” but was rather about protecting investors and keeping the markets robust and competitive. First item up? Reforms to the proxy process to prevent activists from diverting attention from core issues; while he supported shareholder democracy, he believed that democracy should reflect the say of the shareholders, not external parties that, in his view, exploit the existing process to impose their beliefs. The Working Group appears to have identified the shareholder proposal process as instrumental in promoting ESG concerns. Will this spotlight have any impact?
Lots of shareholder proposals on ESG this proxy season—and quite a few anti-ESG proposals too
Notwithstanding legislative and executive action by several states in opposition to the supposed “woke” stances of some businesses on ESG and ESG investing—or perhaps because of it—this proxy season will see a significant number of shareholder proposals related to ESG. (See this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) As described in the 100+-page Proxy Preview 2023 from the Sustainable Investments Institute, As You Sow and Proxy Impact, there have been 542 ESG-related proposals as of mid-February and the number is “on track to match or exceed last year’s unprecedented final total of 627.” Of course, proponents of shareholder proposals don’t often expect to gain a majority vote—even if they did, the proposals are rarely binding. Rather, the goal is frequently to raise the issue for management and shareholders and hope to secure a substantial enough vote in favor to convince management to take action or, as the WSJ reports, to “create pressure for companies to change [or] to take a position on hot-button issues.” The Preview identified as the two biggest changes for the 2023 proxy season a continued increase in climate change-related proposals and, post-Dobbs, a significant number of proposals related to reproductive health. There has also been an increase in proposals identified as “anti-ESG,” and the Preview expects these proposals to increase, despite “the cool reception they receive.” According to a co-author of the report, “[c]omplex environmental and social challenges are not going away just because they prompt controversy….Proxy season will give companies feedback on reform ideas, but there’s no indication attacks on ESG investing are going to dampen investor appetite for facts and disclosure, which make the capital markets work better.”
More prescriptive proposals, less support for 2022 proxy season
This proxy season, companies saw more shareholder proposals than in the past, a change that has been widely attributed to actions by the SEC and its Division of Corporation Finance that had the effect of making exclusion of shareholder proposals—particularly proposals related to environmental and social issues—more of a challenge for companies. As discussed in this article in the WSJ, investors are taking the opportunity to press for more changes at companies. Nevertheless, the prescriptive nature of many of the proposals, especially climate-related proposals, has prompted many shareholders, including major asset managers, to vote against these proposals. Will next season reflect lessons learned by shareholder proponents from this proxy season?
Blackrock to permit some clients to vote—what will be the impact?
According to the Financial Times, “[p]ension funds and retail investors have complained for years over their lack of ability to vote at annual meetings when using an asset manager.” Last week, BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the galaxy with $9.5 trillion under management, announced that, beginning in 2022, it will begin to “expand the opportunity for clients to participate in proxy voting decisions.” BlackRock said that it has been developing this capability in response “to a growing interest in investment stewardship from our clients,” enabling clients “to have a greater say in proxy voting, if that is important to [them].” BlackRock will make the opportunity available initially to institutional clients invested in index strategies—almost $2 trillion of index equity assets in which over 60 million people invest across the globe. It is also looking at expanding “proxy voting choice to even more investors, including those invested in ETFs, index mutual funds and other products.” Will this be a good thing?
BlackRock flexes its muscles during the 2020-21 proxy period
Although BlackRock, which manages assets valued at over $9 trillion, and its CEO, Laurence Fink, have long played an outsized role in promoting corporate sustainability and social responsibility, BlackRock has also long been a target for protests by activists. As reported by Bloomberg, “[e]nvironmental advocates in cities including New York, Miami, San Francisco, London and Zurich targeted BlackRock for a wave of protests in mid-April, holding up images of giant eyeballs to signal that ‘all eyes’ were on BlackRock’s voting decisions.” Of course, protests by climate activists outside of the company’s offices are nothing new. There’s even a global network of NGOs, social movements, grassroots groups and financial advocates called “BlackRock’s Big Problem,” which pressures BlackRock to “rapidly align [its] business practices with a climate-safe world.” Why this singular outrage at BlackRock? Perhaps because, as reflected in press reports like this one in the NYT, activists have reacted to the appearance of stark inconsistencies between the company’s advocacy positions and its proxy voting record: BlackRock has historically conducted extensive engagement with companies but, in the end, voted with management much more often than activists preferred. For example, in the first quarter of 2020, the company supported less than 10% of environmental and social shareholder proposals and opposed three environmental proposals. BlackRock has just released its Investment Stewardship Report for the 2020-2021 proxy voting year (July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021). What a difference a year makes.
You must be logged in to post a comment.