Corp Fin has just posted A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers that summarizes the recent amendments to the definition of “smaller reporting company” and related amendments. (See this PubCo post and this Cooley Alert.) The Guide also provides some clarification regarding timing and transition to the new definition.
Corp Fin has issued two new CDIs related to the voluntary submission of Notices of Exempt Solicitation under Exchange Act Rule 14a-6(g). That rule requires any person who engages in an exempt solicitation pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-2(b)(1) (i.e., without soliciting a proxy) and beneficially owns over $5 million of the class of securities subject to the solicitation to furnish or mail to the SEC a Notice of Exempt Solicitation. Rule 14a-103 requires the soliciting party to attach the written soliciting materials required to be submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1). Recently, some shareholders (think John Chevedden) have begun to submit these Notices voluntarily in what appears to be a way to publicly to express their views on proposals.
Corp Fin has announced that it intends to begin to publicly release on EDGAR “bedbug” letters—letters issued by Corp Fin to advise the issuer that its registration statement or other offering document is so deficient that Corp Fin won’t even bother to review it until the filing is amended to repair the deficiencies. (This type of “bedbug” letter is not to be confused with the “poison pen” type of “bedbug” letter that is frequently submitted to the SEC by participants in proxy contests for the purpose of identifying errors, misleading statements and violations made in filings by their opponents. Why they are both called “bedbug” letters is above my pay grade.)
For quite a while, the CDIs related to the proxy rules and proxy statements have been a bit of a hodge-podge of different sources and supplements. There were even interpretations extant from the ancient Telephone Interpretations Manual—you may even have a mimeograph copy of that in your office somewhere. Now, Corp Fin has undertaken to update and harmonize some of those proxy-related interpretations, specifically the basic Interpretations Manual and its March 1999 Supplement. The rest of the supplements remain undisturbed for the moment; however, Corp Fin advises that it is in the process of updating them all.
In past few years, after Corp Fin issued Staff Legal Bulletin 14H redefining the meaning of “direct conflict” under the Rule 14a-8(i)(9) exclusion for “conflicting proposals,” the staff has continued to fill in the outline of what works and what doesn’t work under the new interpretation of the exclusion. In American Airlines Group (avail. April 2, 2018), the staff concluded that the approach taken by the company was coloring outside the lines and denied no-action relief.
The WSJ is reporting that “people familiar with the matter”—every reporter’s favorite source—say that the SEC is “weighing” expanding “test the waters” beyond just EGCs. You might recall that, in 2012, the JOBS Act allowed IPO candidates that were EGCs to take preliminary steps to determine the potential level of investor interest before committing to the expensive and time-consuming prospectus drafting and SEC review process. That flexibility, together with the new confidential IPO filing process—which allowed EGCs to start the SEC review process on a confidential basis so that sensitive information would not be disclosed if they ultimately determined not to move forward with the offering—was intended to promote and facilitate access to the public capital markets. Since that time, however, the IPO market has not exactly taken off like a rocket, and the hand-wringing over the lack of interest in going public has continued. In June 2017, Corp Fin extended the confidential filing process, permitting non-EGCs to submit confidential draft registration statement for IPOs and for most offerings made in the first year after going public. Will testing the waters be the next step?
When we last left the saga of proxy access, we had just started a new chapter on so-called “fix-it” shareholder proposals—efforts to revise existing proxy access bylaws to make them more “shareholder-friendly.” You might recall that, in 2016 and 2017, John Chevedden et al. submitted a slew of fix-it proposals that requested amendments to proxy access bylaws to raise the cap on the number of shareholders that could aggregate their shares to reach the necessary 3% ownership level. Target companies, in turn, submitted no-action requests seeking to exclude those proposals on the basis that they had already been “substantially implemented” under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). In response to the requests for relief, the SEC staff took a uniform no-action position allowing exclusion of these fix-it proposals. But the proponents were persistent and, in 2017, submitted to H&R Block a different formulation of a fix-it proposal that requested only one change — elimination of the cap on shareholder aggregation to achieve the 3% eligibility threshold, as opposed to simply raising the cap to a higher number. This time, the staff rejected H&R Block’s no-action request. In essence, it appears that the staff believes that a lower cap on aggregation could “substantially implement” a higher cap, but the removal of a cap entirely is a different animal that could not be substantially implemented by the lower cap. (For more history on these fix-it proposals, see this PubCo post.) This proxy season, the proponents have latched onto—and even expanded—the new formulation and have continued to find success in preventing exclusion.