Category: Executive Compensation
SEC Enforcement charges Express for failure to disclose CEO perks
The SEC has announced settled charges against Express, Inc., a multi-brand American fashion retailer formerly listed on the NYSE, for failing to disclose over a three-year period almost $1 million in perks provided to its now former CEO. What were those perks? About a half of that amount was attributable to the perk that seems to trip up so many companies (and flashing favorite target of SEC Enforcement): use of company-owned or -leased aircraft and other travel expenses for personal purposes. The SEC also charged that the company “did not have adequate controls, policies, or procedures in place to effectively identify and analyze potential compensation for disclosure.” However, the SEC did not impose civil penalties on the company, which filed for bankruptcy, in light of its cooperation. According to Sanjay Wadhwa, the Acting Director of Enforcement, “[p]ublic companies have a duty to comply with their disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation, including perks and personal benefits, so that investors can make educated investment decisions….Here, although Express fell short in carrying out its obligation, the Commission declined to impose a civil penalty based, in part, on the company’s self-report, cooperation with the staff’s investigation, and remedial efforts.”
Are ESG performance metrics in comp plans just a layup with little impact?
There’s been a lot of attention lately to the use of ESG metrics as incentives in executive compensation, perhaps because the concept of ESG has become something of a lightning rod in the political landscape—particularly given the fallout from recent court decisions on diversity as well as escalating activity by anti-ESG groups. As discussed below, consultants have found that the use of ESG metrics seems to have levelled out, as some institutional investors have begun to view them cautiously and some academics studies have questioned their rigor and even their benefit. Companies employing ESG metrics as part of their comp plans may want to consider some of the issues raised by these studies, such as level of challenge and transparency, in designing their ESG metrics.
Are responses to failed say-on-pay votes consequential?
Are you ever surprised that more companies don’t fail their say-on-pay votes? Say on pay was adopted by the SEC under a Dodd-Frank mandate signed into law against the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis. The mandate was enacted largely in reaction to the public’s railing against the runaway levels of compensation paid to some corporate executives despite poor performance by their companies, especially when those firms were viewed as contributors to the crisis itself. Say on pay was expected to help rein in excessive levels of compensation and, even though the vote was advisory only, ascribe some level of accountability to boards and compensation committees that set executive compensation levels. But, while say on pay may have driven more investor engagement—certainly a good thing—the anticipated say-on-pay challenge by shareholders to out-of-line pay packages did not really materialize. From the get-go, the average failure rate has only been about 2%. Instead, say-on-pay votes have served largely as confirmations of board decisions regarding executive compensation and not, in most cases, as the kind of rock-throwing exercises that many companies had feared and some governance activists had hoped. According to a 2011 Business Week article, Robert A.G. Monks, who founded ISS in 1985, concluded that say on pay was “‘at best a diversion and at worst a deception….You only have the appearance of reform, and it’s a cruel hoax.’” This paper, Failed Say on Pay: How Do Companies Course Correct after to a ‘No’ Vote?, from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, with authors from Stanford and Equilar, looked at the 2% that fail the vote and what they did in response to pass muster with investors. But the underlying message is reflected in the authors’ questions: “Does this process reflect a healthy dynamic of the market correcting egregious practices, or does it simply reflect a standardization process whereby observed outlier practices are brought in line with industry norms? Do the changes companies make in response to a failed vote lead to substantive improvement in the managerial incentives of their pay programs?”
Is there a place for more inside directors on corporate boards?
In this article in the Harvard Business Review, a law professor from the University of Calgary makes “The Case for More Company Insiders on Boards.” From the end of World War II to the 1970s, he observes, the composition of most boards of U.S. companies was predominantly insider—75% of board directors were insiders in the decade after World War II. But, he maintains, that changed “in the wake of the rising distrust of all American institutions” after Viet Nam and Watergate in the 1970s, as new concepts of corporate governance emerged and the NYSE began to adopt listing rule changes, such as a requirement for independent audit committees. And after the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals of the 2000s, further changes in corporate governance requirements and expectations for board independence ultimately made the overwhelming prevalence of independent directors on corporate boards and committees de rigueur. By 2005, the author reports, 75% of directors of large U.S. public companies were independent and, as of 2023, that percentage had risen to 85%. But is that necessarily a good thing? Maybe not so much, the author contends. Rather, he maintains, the “empirical research on director independence suggests…that business leaders should re-consider the merits of inside directors.”
SEC approves Nasdaq corporate governance rule changes
In May, Nasdaq proposed to revise some of its corporate governance rules—specifically Rules 5605, 5615 and 5810—to modify the phase-in schedules for the independent director and committee requirements in connection with a slew of different circumstances: IPOs, spin-offs and carve-outs, companies emerging from bankruptcy, companies ceasing to qualify as Foreign Private Issuers, companies ceasing to be controlled companies, companies transferring from other national securities exchanges, and companies listing securities that were, immediately prior to listing, registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act. In addition, Nasdaq proposed to codify or amend its practices regarding the applicability of certain cure periods. Many of the changes proposed by Nasdaq were similar to rules that had previously been approved for the NYSE. There were apparently no comments received on the proposal, even after the SEC designated a longer time period for approval. On Monday, the SEC approved Nasdaq’s proposal.
Are companies getting the clawback checkboxes right?
As you know, in 2022, the SEC adopted a new clawback rule, Exchange Act Rule 10D-1, which directed the national securities exchanges to establish listing standards requiring listed issuers to adopt and comply with a clawback policy and to provide disclosure about the policy and its implementation. Under the rules, the clawback policy had to provide that, in the event the listed issuer was required to prepare an accounting restatement—including not just “reissuance,” or “Big R,” restatements, but also “revision” or “little r” restatements—the issuer must recover the incentive-based compensation that was erroneously paid to its current or former executive officers based on the misstated financial reporting measure. The recovery policy had to apply to incentive compensation received during the three completed fiscal years immediately preceding the date that the company was required to prepare a restatement. (See this PubCo post.) The clawback rules added a requirement to include new checkboxes on the cover pages of Form 10-K, Form 20-F and Form 40-F to indicate separately (a) whether the financial statements of the issuer included in the filing reflect correction of errors to previously issued financial statements, and (b) whether any of those error corrections are restatements that required a recovery analysis of incentive-based compensation received by any of the issuer’s executive officers during the relevant recovery period. (See this PubCo post.) It’s worth noting here that the first box, which applies to correction of any errors in the financial statements filed, is broader in scope than the second, which applies if the restatements needed a potential clawback analysis, even if no actual recovery was required. Apparently, there hasn’t been much action for the second box. In this article, Bloomberg reports on a study by research firm Nonlinear Analytics LLC, which showed that of “the 205 companies that reported accounting corrections in their annual financial statements so far this year, just 29—less than 15%—said they reviewed the error to see if they needed to force a compensation clawback,” i.e., reported that they performed a potential recovery analysis. And, only two of the companies that performed an analysis ended up clawing back any executive bonuses.
New Cooley Alert: ISS Opens Survey for 2025 Policy Changes; Glass Lewis Seeks Informal Feedback
It’s that time again—ISS and Glass Lewis have launched their annual policy surveys, where they seek your feedback on some of their policies. That makes it just right time to get the scoop from this helpful new Cooley Alert, ISS Opens Survey for 2025 Policy Changes; Glass Lewis Seeks Informal Feedback, from our Compensation and Benefits and Public Companies groups. As discussed in the Alert, both surveys address executive comp issues; separately, ISS “focuses more on shareholder proposal-related policies,” and Glass Lewis asks “numerous questions regarding board oversight and performance, including director accountability.” The Alert suggests that the 2025 amendments “may be relatively low impact,” consistent with the “relatively minor policy amendments from ISS and Glass Lewis in 2024.” Be sure to check out the new Alert!
Do companies adopt clawback policies exceeding minimum SEC requirements?
In 2022, after seven years of marinating on the SEC’s long-term agenda, the SEC adopted rules to implement Section 954 of Dodd-Frank, the clawback provision. The rules directed the national securities exchanges to establish listing standards requiring listed issuers to adopt and comply with a clawback policy and to provide disclosure about the policy and its implementation. Under the rules, the clawback policy was required to provide that, in the event the listed issuer was required to prepare an accounting restatement—including not just “reissuance,” or “Big R,” restatements, but also “revision” or “little r” restatements—the issuer must recover the incentive-based compensation that was erroneously paid to its current or former executive officers based on the misstated financial reporting measure. (See this PubCo post.) The requirements have been in effect for a bit now. But how did companies respond? Did they stick to the script? Or, after examining their own “governance philosophies,” did companies amp up the rules to actually expand the scope of their clawback policies? This piece from consultant FW Cook reporting on their study of large cap companies showed that “80% maintain an expanded clawback policy that goes beyond the SEC requirements.”
Nasdaq proposes rule changes related to phase-ins and cure periods
Nasdaq has proposed to modify some of its corporate governance rules—specifically Rules 5605, 5615 and 5810—to modify the phase-in schedules for the independent director and committee requirements in connection with IPOs, spin-offs and carve-outs, bankruptcy and other specified circumstances and to clarify the applicability of certain cure periods.
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